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ARTICLE 
FACTUAL PRECEDENTS 
ALLISON ORR LARSEN† 
Lawyers and judges speak to each other in a language of precedents—decisions 
from cases that have come before. The most persuasive precedent to cite, of course, is 
an on-point decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. But Supreme Court opinions are 
changing. They contain more factual claims about the world than ever before, and 
those claims are now rich with empirical data. This Supreme Court factfinding is 
also highly accessible; fast digital research leads directly to factual language in old 
cases that is perfect for arguments in new ones. An unacknowledged consequence of 
all this is the rise of what I call “factual precedents”: the tendency of lower courts to 
cite Supreme Court cases as authorities on factual subjects, as evidence that the 
factual claims are indeed true. Rather than citing, for example, evidence from the 
record to establish that carpal tunnel syndrome regularly resolves without surgery, 
lower courts instead cite language from a Supreme Court opinion for that point. 
This Article carefully describes how lower courts are using Supreme Court facts 
today and then argues that these factual precedents are unwise. The Supreme Court 
is not a factfinding institution. Facts change over time. And, unlike legal precedents, 
one cannot be certain that factual statements from the Supreme Court are carefully 
deliberated and carry the force of law. I argue that Supreme Court statements of 
fact should not receive any authoritative force separate from the force that attaches 
to whatever legal conclusions they contributed to originally. If a fact is so central to 
the legal holding that the two meld together, then the Supreme Court is free to so 
state and thus insulate the factual conclusion from future challenges by making it 
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part of the legal rule. But the presumption, I suggest, should be no precedential 
value for generalized factual claims—even if they are facts found in the U.S. 
Reports.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers and judges speak to each other in a language of precedents—
decisions from cases that have come before.1 The most persuasive precedent 
to cite—either to a judge in argument or from a judge in explanation—is an 
on-point decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. Because lower courts in our 
legal system treat decisions of higher courts with supervisory jurisdiction as 
 
1 See Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1934-35 (2008) 
(“[L]aw is, at bottom, an authoritative practice . . . . [T]he law’s practice of using and announc-
ing its authorities . . . is part and parcel of law’s character.”). 
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binding authority, a precedent from the very highest court effectively takes 
the issue off the table in the lower court.2 Supreme Court precedents, 
therefore, are extremely valuable to all litigants and judges across the 
country. 
But Supreme Court opinions are changing. They are longer.3 They 
spawn more concurrences and dissents.4 They include more citations than 
ever before.5 And the citations are changing too. The Justices are not just 
citing cases. The Supreme Court is in the “throes of a widespread empirical 
turn”6; consequently, its opinions are chock-full of statistics, social science 
studies, and other general statements of fact about the world.7 
 
2 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 128 
(1997) (noting that, because of “[p]rinciples of stare decisis,” once a “question is decided in an 
appellate court, . . . lower courts are then responsible for following that decision”); see also 
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 433, 479 (2012) (“Supreme Court holdings are strictly binding on the lower 
courts.”). 
3 See Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme 
Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 646 (2008) (documenting the increase in opinion length 
over time). 
4 See Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
362, 375-76 (2001) (analyzing the increase in dissenting opinions over time and providing 
empirical evidence for the argument that judges no longer hide their private disagreements from 
the public as judges in the nineteenth century did); Linda Greenhouse, The High Court and the 
Triumph of Discord, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at WK1 (describing the culture of dissent that has 
become entrenched within the Supreme Court over time). 
5 See Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their Use 
and Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 531-37 (noting that the increase in citations over time 
may be the natural result of various factors, including the larger number of cases to cite, the 
existence of digital databases like LexisNexis and Westlaw, which facilitate the finding of citations, 
and the increased use of law clerks who seem eager to use citations). 
6 Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths, 
82 N.C. L. REV. 115, 118 (2003); see also Tracy L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in 
Criminal Law and Procedure—And Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 851, 853 (explaining that, 
over the past decade, judges and lawyers have begun to cite to empirical studies in their work with 
increasing regularity); Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial 
Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 658-68 (1988) (providing a historical 
account of the use of facts in judicial opinions and noting that “[o]nce heretical, the belief that 
empirical studies can influence the content of legal doctrine is now one of the few points of 
general agreement among jurists” (quoting John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: 
Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 477 (1986))); 
cf. Ellie Margolis, Authority Without Borders: The World Wide Web and the Delegalization of Law, 41 
SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 912 (2011) (observing how the digital revolution has “blurr[ed] . . . 
the line between legal and nonlegal authority” in recent judicial opinions). 
7 I have previously considered how Supreme Court Justices inform themselves about these 
factual questions. See Allison O. Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 
1255, 1286-90 (2012). That article discussed the upstream flow of factual information at the 
Supreme Court—where the authorities come from. This Article discusses the downstream—what 
happens in the lower courts after the factual statements become enshrined in the U.S. Reports.  
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As Supreme Court opinions are fattening up, legal research methods 
have also changed. Full text searching enables a new emphasis on quotes 
over holdings and “words over concepts.”8 Gone are the days of hunting for 
principles of law in a digest or Shepardizing a case for ones with similar 
facts.9 The new digital mode of legal research often leads directly to language 
in a decided case that is perfect for an argument in a new one—regardless of 
whether the language was central to the case in which it was offered or 
whether the holding of the cited case has any relevance to the one at hand. 
As Fred Schauer put it years ago, “[I]t is not what the Supreme Court held 
that matters, but what it said. In interpretive arenas below the Supreme 
Court, one good quote is worth a hundred clever analyses of the holding.”10 
An unacknowledged consequence of all this is the rise of what I call “fac-
tual precedents”: the tendency of lower courts to over-rely on Supreme 
Court opinions and to apply generalized statements of fact from old cases to 
new ones.11 Rather than citing, for example, evidence from the record to 
establish that many mild cases of carpal tunnel syndrome resolve without 
surgery, lower courts instead cite language from a Supreme Court opinion 
for that point.12  
 
8 Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 
245-48 (2010).  
9 See Katrina Fischer Kuh, Electronically Manufactured Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 223, 243-
44 (2008) (explaining that, unlike the paradigmatic electronic research process, the “print-only 
world was largely controlled by case digests and indices,” in which the researcher played an “active 
role in making matches between the research question and the topics and key numbers”).  
10 Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682, 683 (1986).  
11 A handful of others have observed the confusion surrounding the precedential value of 
factual claims. See, e.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 141-58 (2008) (addressing whether lower courts can “revisit 
precedent so as to adjust earlier rulings to account for a changed factual landscape”); Stuart M. 
Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 
TEX. L. REV. 269, 369-71 (1999) (discussing implications for reviewing courts when facts of a case 
change); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights Cases, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 1185, 1236-37 (2013) (discussing that a “common area of confusion that arises when 
courts address issues of constitutional social fact is a blurring between normative judgments and 
empirical fact”); Kenneth C. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 970 (1955) (discussing 
courts’ tendency to apply stare decisis to findings of fact); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: 
Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 64 (2011) (“Whatever the law might 
require, lower courts will, as a practical matter, often reflexively follow a statement by a higher 
court, even if the statement is only dictum or a factual finding that perhaps ought not be 
binding.”). 
12 See, e.g., Heimann v. Roadway Express, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 886, 904 (N.D. Ill. 2002) 
(citing Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 199 (2002), for 
the proposition that “one quarter of the carpal tunnel cases resolve within one month without 
surgical intervention”). 
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To be sure, factual claims play different roles at the Court. Sometimes 
the Court’s understanding of a generalized fact leads it to adopt one legal 
rule over another. The holding in Brown v. Board of Education relied on the 
factual assertion that African American children are psychologically harmed 
by segregated schools.13 The holding in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission relied on the factual claim that corporate independent expendi-
tures do not corrupt politics.14 Whether legal holdings should rely on factual 
claims and how vulnerable those decisions are for reversal is a debate for 
another day. This Article tackles a different question: Namely, should the 
Court’s statements of fact ever receive separate precedential force, distinct 
from the precedential force of whatever legal conclusions they contributed 
to originally? 
In this Article, I argue no. The traditional arguments favoring strong 
stare decisis do not apply to statements of fact. The Supreme Court is not a 
factfinding institution. Facts change over time. And, most troubling, factual 
authorities employed instrumentally by the Justices—for persuasive rheto-
ric—may not be carefully deliberated, may not have garnered the support of 
five Justices, and may be selected for reasons other than that they are the 
most reliable sources. At bottom, the fear is that lower court judges will take 
something as authoritative from one who is not an authority on the subject. 
Factual statements about the way the world works should not be entrenched 
for the whole country in this way.  
A concrete example might help. In 2009, in Nken v. Holder, the Supreme 
Court ruled on the legal standard to apply when a noncitizen sought to stay 
his deportation pending judicial review of his appeal.15 At the end of the 
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts opined that deportation did not result in 
irreparable injury.16 He added, “Aliens who are removed may continue to 
pursue their petitions for review, and those who prevail can be afforded 
effective relief by facilitation of their return, along with restoration of the 
immigration status they had upon removal.”17 This statement has a factual 
component—a true or false assertion about prevalent immigration practices—
that was based on assurances from the Solicitor General in his brief that the 
United States tries to facilitate the return of deported immigrants who later 
win their appeals.  
 
13 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954). 
14 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010). 
15 556 U.S. 418, 433-46 (2009).  
16 Id. at 435. 
17 Id.  
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After inquiries from immigration attorneys, the Solicitor General admitted 
in a letter to the Supreme Court that he is “not confident” that U.S. policy 
is as clear as described in the Nken brief.18 Immigration rights groups are 
not satisfied by this letter, however.19 Interestingly, they do not seek a 
rehearing of the Nken case—perhaps acknowledging that the factual mistake 
would not cause the Court to alter the result. What they are worried about, 
instead, is that other courts will rely on this statement of fact in Nken to the 
detriment of noncitizens in other cases.20 They are, in other words, worried 
about the factual precedent coming out of Nken. And they have reason to 
worry: at least ten courts to date (federal and state) have quoted the above 
statement from the Chief Justice about the general tendencies of immigra-
tion officials.21  
Nken is not an outlier. Lower courts cite the Supreme Court to establish, 
for example, that forensic evidence is frequently manipulated,22 post-
abortion depression is exaggerated,23 Americans attend church more often 
than citizens of other nations,24 predatory pricing rarely occurs in the 
 
18 See Jess Bravin, Correct the Record, Rights Groups Say After DoJ Admits Mistake, WALL ST. J. 
L. BLOG (May 4, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/05/04/correct-the-record-rights-groups-
say-after-doj-admits-mistake (noting that the Solicitor General’s office admitted that it “mistaken-
ly stated that it routinely ‘facilitates’ the return to the U.S. of deported immigrants who later win 
their appeals”). 
19 Id. 
20 Id.; see also Nancy Morawetz, Convenient Facts: Nken v. Holder, the Solicitor General, and 
the Presentation of Internal Government Facts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1600, 1602 (2013) (manuscript at 
103) (complaining that “the damage was done . . . lower courts had already revised caselaw about 
stays in light of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement”). 
21 See, e.g., Juarez-Chavez v. Holder, 515 F. App’x 463, 467 (6th Cir. 2013); Luna v. Holder, 
637 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2011); Spence v. Holder, 414 F. App’x 637, 639 n.4 (5th Cir. 2011); 
Lezama-Garcia v. Holder, 666 F.3d 518, 537-38 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Adame-Orozco, 
607 F.3d 647, 655 n.10 (10th Cir. 2010); Rodriguez-Barajas v. Holder, 624 F.3d 678, 681 n.3 (5th 
Cir. 2010); Jimenez v. Napolitano, No. 12-3558, 2012 WL 3144026, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2012); 
Nat’l Immigration Project of Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 868 F. Supp. 
2d 284, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Désiré v. Holder, No. 08-1329, 2009 WL 4898261, at *2 (D. Ariz. 
Dec. 14, 2009); Villajin v. Mukasey, No. 08-0839, 2009 WL 1459210, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 26, 
2009).  
22 See, e.g., Matthies v. State, 85 So. 3d 838, 845 (Miss. 2012) (citing Melandez-Diaz v. Mas-
sachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009)). 
23 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 750 (8th Cir. 
2008) (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 183 n.7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
24 See, e.g., Card v. City of Everett, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1173 n.2 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (citing 
McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 882 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
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market,25 campaign donations lead to biased judges,26 and psychopaths 
retain some ability to control their behavior.27  
Lower courts seem confused about what to do with these Supreme 
Court findings of fact.28 Some courts deny being bound by the factual 
findings of higher courts.29 Others say it makes no sense to reproduce all of 
the factual evidence—on abortion procedures or effects of campaign finance 
laws, for example—in every relevant case.30 What is clear, however, is that 
despite what they say about the limits of stare decisis, “the tendency of the 
courts to apply that principle to findings of fact is a rather substantial 
one.”31 This particularly holds true for statements of fact that come from the 
 
25 See, e.g., McGuire Oil Co. v. Mapco Petroleum, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (S.D. Ala. 
1991) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)), rev’d sub 
nom., McGuire Oil Co. v. Pampco. Inc., 986 F.2d 444 (11th Cir. 1993). 
26 See, e.g., Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 839 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Republican Party of 
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789-90 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring)), rev’d, 674 F.3d 1010 
(8th Cir. 2012). 
27 People v. Williams, 74 P.3d 779, 782 (Cal. 2003) (citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 
(2002)). 
28 See Davis, supra note 11 (discussing courts’ tendency to apply stare decisis to findings of 
fact); Gorod, supra note 11 (explaining that lower courts “often reflexively follow a statement by a 
higher court, even if the statement is only dictum or a factual finding that perhaps ought not be 
binding”); see also FAIGMAN, supra note 11, at 114 (“The [Supreme] Court has no overriding theory 
of when it should be deferential to other bodies—judicial and nonjudicial—that have made 
findings of constitutional fact.”).  
29 See, e.g., A Woman’s Choice–E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 689 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (“Th[e] admixture of fact and law, sometimes called an issue of ‘constitutional fact,’ is 
reviewed without deference in order to prevent the idiosyncrasies of a single judge or jury from 
having far-reaching legal effects.”). 
30 See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(“Carhart established the health exception requirement as a per se constitutional rule. This rule is 
based on substantial medical authority (from a broad array of sources) recognized by the Supreme 
Court, and this body of medical authority does not have to be reproduced in every subsequent 
challenge to a ‘partial birth abortion’ statute lacking a health exception.”), vacated sub nom. 
Herring v. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women, 550 U.S. 901 (2007); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 
857, 884 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting) (“[T]he health effects of ‘partial birth’ abor-
tion . . . should indeed be treated as a legislative fact, rather than an adjudicative fact, in order to 
avoid inconsistent results arising from the reactions of different district judges . . . to different 
records . . . .”), vacated sub nom. Christensen v. Doyle, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000); see also Long Beach 
Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 695 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Supreme 
Court precedent forecloses the City’s argument that independent expenditures by independent 
expenditure committees (‘IECs’), like the Chamber PACs, raise the specter of corruption or the 
appearance thereof.”); Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 158 (D.D.C.) (“To 
the extent the FEC argues that large contributions to the national parties are corrupting and can 
be limited because they create gratitude, facilitate access, or generate influence, Citizens United 
makes clear that those theories are not viable.”), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010). 
31 Davis, supra note 11. 
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Supreme Court—regardless of how central the fact was to the legal rule 
announced in the original case.32  
This Article highlights this growing problem and offers one possible 
solution to the confusion. I argue that lower courts should never give 
separate precedential force to Supreme Court findings of fact. These 
generalized factual claims should not even be treated as extra persuasive 
because they appear in the U.S. Reports. A lower court should not care 
what Justice O’Connor says about carpal tunnel syndrome or what Justices 
Kennedy or Ginsburg say about post-abortion depression. There should not, 
in other words, be precedential force for any factual statement by the 
Supreme Court distinct from the force attached to the legal holding it 
helped to create. The creeping temptation in the lower courts to answer 
factual questions by relying on decisions from the Supreme Court is one 
that should be resisted. 
Accepting my position is most difficult in cases when it seems the Supreme 
Court is trying to assert its authority on a factual matter and to settle a 
debate for the country. For example, take the campaign finance finding in 
Citizens United33 that corporate independent expenditures do not corrupt 
the political process, and the affirmative action fact found in Grutter v. 
Bollinger34 that exposure to racially diverse viewpoints is critical to a good 
law school education. Are these facts open for debate in subsequent litiga-
tion in the lower courts? 
On this final question, I offer some intentionally preliminary answers. I 
certainly do not endorse a factual free-for-all in the lower courts. But there 
are ways for the Supreme Court to control the precedential treatment of its 
decisions without creating factual precedents. If the Court wants to make 
something unreviewable by lower courts, it can clearly articulate that any 
factual claim it endorses is just part of the legal rule. If it does not do that, 
however, then the factual question should remain open; the presumption 
should be against precedential value for factual findings.  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part One defines factual precedents, 
and Part Two describes in detail how lower courts are using Supreme Court 
statements of fact as authoritative. Part Three then asserts that factual 
precedents are unwise and argues against their use. Part Four concludes by 
suggesting that some high-profile Supreme Court factual findings are not 
 
32 As one district court noted candidly, “‘[B]y the way’ statements made by the Supreme 
Court resonate more forcefully than dicta from other sources.” United States v. Miller, 604 F. 
Supp. 2d 1162, 1167 (W.D. Tenn. 2009). 
33 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
34 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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actually facts but instead are just generalizations that form components of 
legal rules. This Article calls for lower courts to resist overusing factual 
statements in Supreme Court opinions and for the Supreme Court to be 
more precise with its factual labels.  
I. WHAT ARE FACTUAL PRECEDENTS? 
A. Law Versus Fact 
The first order of business in defining a factual precedent is to be clear 
about what constitutes a fact. It is true that the line distinguishing law from 
fact starts to dissolve if one thinks too deeply about it. Many statements 
that seem to be pure legal propositions can actually be repackaged as 
statements of fact without much effort. For example, “separate but equal is 
not equal” can be restated as “separate schools psychologically harm minori-
ty children.”35 And naked statements of normative preferences or value 
judgments, such as “abortion is hard on women,” can also easily look like 
factual assertions once they are followed by a citation with supporting 
empirical research. 
Indeed, differentiating law from fact has spawned a healthy debate about 
whether there is even a difference between the two concepts. Some, like 
Ronald Allen, Michael Pardo, and Gary Lawson, claim that the law–fact 
distinction is a myth and “the quest to find ‘the’ essential difference between 
the two . . . is doomed from the start.”36 These scholars argue that so-
called issues of fact and law involve both arguing from evidence “and the 
 
35 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact 
Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1961 (2006) (noting that Brown v. Board of Education 
turned on “‘modern authority’ regarding race discrimination’s harmful effects on educational 
opportunities”). Goldberg states that similar factual assertions were critical in sex equality cases in 
the 1970s and in gay rights cases today. Id. at 1966. For example, she notes the judicial reliance on 
the “fact” that women lacked the capacity for prolonged labor or the “fact” that children fare better 
in the homes of heterosexual couples. Id. at 1967-68. 
36 Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law–Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1769, 1770 (2003); see also Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial 
Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1172-77 (2001) (challenging the distinction 
between law and fact in the context of judicial decisions to defer to Congress); Gary Lawson, 
Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (1992) (“[T]he law–fact distinction, whatever its 
utility, is purely a creature of convention.”); John O. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging 
Facts Like Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69, 71 (2008) (“There is no analytic dichotomy between 
law and fact. Law is a social fact, just as are the data or statistical analysis that may be relevant to 
questions such as whether partial abortions are ever medically necessary.”); Saul M. Pilchen, 
Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court Should Defer to Congressional Factfinding 
Under the Post Civil War Amendments, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 337, 379-80 (1984) (calling the 
line between law and fact a “slippery” one). 
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attempt to reconstruct some segment of reality.”37 The only meaningful 
difference between the two, they say, is a functional one about allocating 
authority (between judge and jury, trial court and reviewing court, and the 
like).38 
Other scholars, however, like Henry Monaghan and Richard Friedman, 
argue that law and fact are distinct, real, and separate categories. Monaghan 
concedes that the concepts are not “static, polar opposites. Rather, law and 
fact have a nodal quality; they are points of rest and relative stability on a 
continuum of experience.”39 Likewise, Friedman argues that while the line 
between law and fact is not always easy to draw, it is more than just conven-
tion. He claims that “ordinary factual issues relate to constructing some 
aspect of reality; whereas, the legal issues relate to prescribing the norms 
that apply and consequences that attach to that constructed reality.”40 
Thankfully this is not a debate that needs to be resolved today. Instead, 
it is enough for present purposes to note two uncontroverted truths.  
First, wrestling with the distinction between law and fact is a task we ask 
courts and administrative agencies to master all the time.41 Even those 
scholars who decry that there is no analytical distinction between law and 
fact admit the central importance of the labels in our legal system.42 Identi-
fying an issue as a factual one matters in terms of whether an issue goes to 
the jury, whether a reviewing court defers to a lower court, and whether a 
precedent is ripe for reversal.43  
 
37 Allen & Pardo, supra note 36, at 1792-93. 
38 See Lawson, supra note 36, at 862-63 (explaining that one reason for the enduring character 
of the law–fact distinction is that “it provides a serviceable, if not indispensable, tool for allocating 
decisionmaking authority in a complex, lawyered legal system”). 
39 Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 233 (1985). 
40 Allen & Pardo, supra note 36, at 1801 (citing Richard D. Friedman, Standards of Persuasion 
and the Distinction Between Fact and Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 917-19 (1992)). 
41 Goldberg, supra note 35, at 1964 (describing “fact-based adjudication” and noting that 
“courts focus on facts alone when evaluating restrictions on social groups,” like minorities in race, 
gender, or sexual orientation, even if these facts contain normative judgments).  
42 Allen & Pardo, supra note 36, at 1778 (noting how the law–fact distinction “appears in the 
Constitution” and influences judicial “decision-making authority”). 
43 The Supreme Court’s most famous discussion of stare decisis—Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylyvania v. Casey—announced that it is appropriate to overrule a prior decision 
when the facts or our “understanding of the facts” have changed. 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992). 
Moreover, standards of review of administrative agencies turn on whether the question at hand is 
a legal one or a factual one. Compare Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951) 
(setting a standard of review for factual findings of administrative agencies), with Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984) (setting a standard of review for 
agency legal interpretations). For other examples of significant consequences that attach to the 
law–fact distinction, see Allen & Pardo, supra note 36, at 1778. 
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Second, rightly or wrongly, most lawyers and judges have confidence in 
their ability to distinguish law from fact. This confidence likely comes from 
the pedigree of the distinction and its centrality in the practice of law.44 
Putting aside the robust academic debate about defining facts, therefore, the 
reality is that we often intuitively identify factual claims—we know them 
when we see them. As Fred Schauer and Virginia Wise once explained, “All 
distinctions potentially have borderline cases, . . . [a]nd although lawyers, 
particularly, are likely to be preoccupied with dusk when people ask them 
about the distinction between night and day,” the distinction is still worth 
making in the first instance.45 Put differently, I acknowledge the possibility 
that there may be no clear analytic distinction between law and fact. But 
due to the practical importance of the line and its entrenched place in our 
legal system, it is necessary to discuss what leads most of us to label certain 
statements as facts and other statements as law.46  
To borrow insight from scientists, factual claims are ones that can be 
falsified (at least theoretically).47 “The hallmark of scientific statements is 
that they are vulnerable to refutation.”48 As David Faigman helpfully 
explains, “One example of a falsifiable statement would be the view that 
criminal penalties operate to deter criminal conduct. As a logical matter, 
 
44 See Allen & Pardo, supra note 36, at 1778 (attributing the “pedigree and usefulness” of the 
law–fact distinction to the fact that it “appears in the Constitution and has traditionally helped to 
allocate decision-making authority”). 
45 Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law, 
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495, 498 (2000). 
46 See Pilchen, supra note 36 (noting that the distinction between law and fact is “slippery,” 
but observing that the line seems simple “[u]nder a commonsense analysis”). 
47 At the risk of oversimplifying the very complicated philosophy of science, it is a well-
established, even if not universally accepted, idea in this field that “[f]alsifiability is a criterion for 
demarcating science . . . . A statement is falsifiable, and hence scientific, only if it is incompati-
ble with some basic statement, i.e., a statement reporting the occurrence of an observable event at 
a specified place and time.” Susan Haack, Federal Philosophy of Science: A Deconstruction—And a 
Reconstruction, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 394, 401 (2010) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 401 
nn.25-27 (describing the philosophy of the late Karl Popper who spent his career attempting to 
distinguish scientific statements from nonscientific ones using falsifiability).  
Even Karl Popper conceded that neither falsifiability “nor any other criterion []can distin-
guish science from pseudo-science on the basis of formal logic alone.” Adina Schwartz, A “Dogma 
of Empiricism” Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the 
Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 176 (1997). F0r 
information on Popper, see Karl Popper, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Stephen 
Thornton ed., 2009). But although it may not be perfect, I am not the first legal scholar to have 
borrowed falsifiability as a criterion to distinguish fact from law. See David L. Faigman, To Have 
and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 
1005, 1017 (1989); Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 
145, 150 (“I rely on the basic scientific definition of facts as (at least in theory) falsifiable.”). 
48 Faigman, supra note 47, at 1017.  
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this statement is potentially falsifiable by a variety of observations incon-
sistent with the stated relationship.”49 By contrast, the normative belief in 
the retributive value of punishment is not one that can be proven true or 
false.50 It is not, in other words, a claim of fact. 
To be sure, a legal ruling can also be refuted. It can be an awkward un-
derstanding of words or an unfaithful application of precedent. But a factual 
claim is potentially wrong in a different way. A factual claim can be tested 
“with a degree of detached certainty.”51 It is theoretically accurate or inaccu-
rate. When a Supreme Court Justice states that a child’s brain development 
can be altered by violent video games, that claim is subsequently critiqued 
by neuroscientists as either true or false—either supported by the evidence 
or not.52 Scientists would not critique the claim as illogical, unprecedented, 
or bad policy—those arguments are instead for lawyers to mount at legal 
conclusions. 
Relatedly, factual statements call out for evidence.53 In a casual debate 
with a friend, for example, a factual assertion is often followed by “look it 
up” (or, more likely, “Google it”), whereas a normative assertion or a 
proffered legal interpretation is not. As Amy Kapczynski stated when 
describing a factual inquiry, “Finding the facts involves investigation, and 
the facts can be more or less certain, depending on the quality of the 
evidence and the quality of the sleuthing.”54 Legal inquiries, by contrast, are 
resolved by tools of the legal trade, such as analogies, logical reasoning, 
common sense, and, yes, even normative judgments.55 
 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 1016 (“The subjective belief (or disbelief )  in the retributive value of capital punish-
ment does not implicate a fact question that is susceptible to test.”). 
51 Pilchen, supra note 36, at 378. 
52 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2768 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting 
that “[e]xperimental studies in laboratories have found that subjects randomly assigned to play a 
violent video game subsequently displayed more characteristics of aggression than those who 
played nonviolent video games”). For a neuroscientist’s critique of Justice Breyer’s claims, see 
Violent Brains in the Supreme Court, NEUROSKEPTIC ( July 15, 2011), http://neuroskeptic.blogspot. 
com/2011/07/violent-brains-in-supreme-court.html.  
53 See Faigman, supra note 47, at 1020 (“The testing of theories forms the battlefield of the 
scientific enterprise, and it is in the trenches that science maintains its principal advantages over 
common sense . . . . [S]cience subjects theories and hypotheses to systematic and constant tests, 
in order to uncover the outer limits of their strengths or explanatory powers.” (footnote omitted)). 
54 Amy Kapczynski, Historicism, Progress, and the Redemptive Constitution, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1041, 1066-67 (2005).  
55 See Faigman, supra note 47, at 1007 (discussing how “[s]ome disciplines, those traditionally 
classified as the humanities (e.g., philosophy, history, and literature), employ methods commonly 
relied upon by legal analysts, such as logical reasoning, historical analysis, literary interpretation, 
and common sense” (footnotes omitted)). 
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To complicate matters, the facts relevant to this Article are a special 
brand of fact that have come to be known as “legislative facts.”56 A legisla-
tive fact, as I have defined elsewhere and as others have discussed at length, 
is a generalized fact about the world, as opposed to a “whodunit” fact 
relating to the parties before a court in any one case.57 Compared to a so-
called “adjudicative fact” that is case specific, a legislative fact “transcend[s] 
the particular dispute” and provides descriptive information about the world 
that judges use as foundational building blocks to form and apply legal 
rules.58 Judicial opinions are full of these types of generalized facts such as: 
partial birth abortions are never medically necessary,59 fleeing from the 
police in a car leads to fatalities,60 and violent video games affect the 
neurological development of a child’s brain.61  
Generalized statements of fact like these are not subject to the traditional 
procedural rules that govern adjudicative facts.62 Legislative facts come to 
judges’ attention by way of a procedural hodgepodge: sometimes on the 
record and sometimes not, sometimes briefed by the parties and sometimes 
not. In fact, legislative facts are specifically exempted from the Federal Rule 
 
56 Monaghan, supra note 39, at 230 n.16. I admit that the definition of a legislative fact is 
slippery. However, “[l]ike other legal distinctions, the difference between adjudicative and 
legislative facts is one of degree, and for that reason the existence of borderline cases does not 
mean that the distinction is empty.” Id. 
57 See Larsen, supra note 7, at 1255-56. “Legislative fact” and “adjudicative fact” are phrases 
coined by Kenneth Davis. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the 
Administrative Procedures, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942). Others have subsequently refined the 
concept and created new labels, but it is the original Davis articulation upon which I rely. See 
FAIGMAN, supra note 11, at 146 (proposing a “taxonomy” of “constitutional facts”); Sherry, supra 
note 47 (discussing a form of legislative facts she calls “foundational facts,” which “are the 
background facts that are not explicitly at issue in any particular case,” but are instead the factual 
assumptions on which legal doctrine is based).  
58 David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical Compo-
nent of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 552 (1991); see also Brenda C. See, 
Written in Stone? The Record on Appeal and the Decision-Making Process, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 157, 191 
(2004–2005) (asserting that legislative facts are relevant “where the court is in essence ‘making 
law’ either by filling a gap in the common law by formulating a rule, construing a statute, or 
framing a constitutional rule”).  
59 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 141 (2007). 
60 See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2273 (2011). 
61 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2768-69 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
62 See Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 
73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988) (explaining that the rules for gathering adjudicative facts are largely 
ignored with respect to legislative facts). This lack of regulation has led one prominent commenta-
tor to describe the law governing legislative facts as “chaotic.” See FAIGMAN, supra note 11, at xii 
(“[C]onstitutional facts come to the Court’s attention haphazardly.”). 
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of Evidence on Judicial Notice—the rule most on point—and the advisory 
notes actually encourage their “unfettered use.”63  
This sort of fact can be dispositive to the outcome of a case, but it need 
not be. As discussed further below, sometimes a judge uses a legislative fact 
rhetorically to tell a story setting up the pronouncement of a legal rule or to 
bolster the persuasive power of an argument. I count, for example, the 
following Supreme Court statements as factual claims: police training on 
constitutional rights is common across the country,64 schools in the found-
ing generation required strict obedience,65 forensic evidence can be and is 
easily manipulated,66 and immigration officials routinely try to facilitate the 
return of noncitizens who win their appeals.67 
 By contrast, there are certain statements that the Court routinely makes 
that I do not count as factual, even if they arguably deserve that label. For 
example, fifty-state surveys of how the law varies across the country on any 
one issue could be called factual statements, but I do not categorize them as 
such because they are principally used as descriptions of the law. Addition-
ally, questions such as “what have the courts said in the past that they would 
do about situations such as this” might also be called factual, but I do not 
label them as such (nor have other scholars) because “they concern the past 
and prospective conduct of legal officials in determining legal norms”—a 
quality absent from other factual propositions.68  
For purposes of this Article, I do not consider any account about the 
state of the law to be a factual claim. My working definition of a fact that 
could spawn a factual precedent is any claim that can be theoretically 
 
63 See FED. R. EVID. 201(c)–(e); see also FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note. 
64 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006). 
65 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 412 n.2 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Eng-
lish model fostered absolute institutional control of students by faculty both inside and outside the 
classroom. At all the early American schools, students lived and worked under a vast array of rules 
and restrictions.”). 
66 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009). 
67 See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009) (“Aliens who are removed may continue to 
pursue their petitions for review, and those who prevail can be afforded effective relief by 
facilitation of their return . . . .”). One could argue that the factual claim in Nken is only a 
borderline factual claim because it is just a description of how legal officials interpret the law they 
implement. While acknowledging the ambiguity, the factual part of Nken to which I refer is the 
claim underscored by the Solicitor General brief: that it is common for immigration officials to 
facilitate the return of noncitizens who win their appeals. This claim is refutable (as illustrated 
nicely by what happened after this case) by immigration statistics about what actually takes place 
on the ground. For more information on the Nken story and the fallout that ensued, see generally 
Morawetz, supra note 20. 
68 Friedman, supra note 40, at 917. 
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falsified and is followed by citation to some sort of evidence (not a case and 
not a statute).69  
Is the distinction between law and fact airtight? Of course not. But it 
need not be. The point for now is that the distinction has a dominant role in 
our legal system and there are enough shared characteristics of what most 
people call “facts” to justify unique consideration of their precedential 
value. 
B. The Emergence of Factual Precedents 
Based on this working definition of a fact, what then makes a factual 
precedent? In general, precedents are legal principles established in a prior 
case that are binding or persuasive authority in a subsequent case.70 In this 
country, “the authority of precedent is generally thought to be one of the 
most important institutional characteristics of judicial decision making.”71 
A factual precedent, as I am using the phrase, refers to the citation in a 
lower court opinion of a higher court’s generalized factual claim. Granted, it 
is a defining feature of our common law system for judges to draw analogies 
from the facts of one case to the facts of another.72 That is not the phenom-
enon to which I refer.  
Instead, a factual precedent is a lower court’s reliance on the Supreme 
Court’s assertion of legislative fact—a general factual claim—as authority to 
prove that the observation is indeed true. For example, rather than just 
using the work of an historian or a psychologist to establish a factual 
dimension of a case (that the founding generation all owned guns for self-
defense73 or that severely mentally impaired people can still control impulses74), 
 
69 It is certainly quite common for Supreme Court Justices to make statements of general-
ized fact without any accompanying supporting citations. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 
(1973) (“Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and 
future . . . . Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.”). The wisdom of this 
judicial technique is worth discussing, but it is beyond the scope of this particular project. Because 
I am concerned with the use of authorities in judicial decisions, and because my sense is that the 
trend in the digital age is to pepper opinions with empirical data, I limit my discussion of factual 
precedents to those factual claims that are accompanied by a supporting authority. 
70 See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1214-15 (8th ed. 2004) 
71 Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1150 
(2002). 
72 See, e.g., Brown v. Peterson, No. 03-0205, 2006 WL 349805, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 
2006) (comparing the symbol of a noose to the threatening history behind a burning cross as 
recounted in oral arguments in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)); Kuketz v. MDC Fitness, 
Corp., No. 98-1004A, 1998 WL 1119863, at *2 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Aug. 10, 1998) (comparing an 
accommodation required of the Professional Golfers’ Association in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 
U.S. 661 (2001), to an accommodation in handball rules sought by a disabled handball player). 
73 See People v. Nivar, 915 N.Y.S.2d 801, 810 (Sup. Ct. 2011). 
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a lower court quotes relevant language from a Supreme Court decision to 
make the point. A lower court relies on, in other words, the Supreme Court 
(or just a single member of the Court) as an authority to settle the truth of 
the fact in question. 
Factual precedents probably owe their existence to any number of causes. But 
two especially significant changes to the way lawyers and judges process 
information deserve special mention.  
1. Dramatic Changes to Legal Research 
First, there has been nothing short of an absolute revolution in legal 
research methods.75 Before LexisNexis and Westlaw started to offer full-text 
searching (becoming popularly accessible in 1994), all legal research hap-
pened with books.76 In the old days, print-based legal research looked 
something like the following:  
Step one: go to the law library. Step two: find a case digest. Step three: 
identify topics and legal principles relevant to your search using a key 
number system. Step four: read the case summaries that correspond to the 
key numbers. Step five: physically locate the case reporter and pull the 
relevant cases to read.77  
Everyone knows that legal research looks nothing like this anymore. 
Case digests are a thing of the past. Now, legal research amounts to some 
creative word searches and a click of the mouse.78 Electronic researchers do 
not encounter cases through “the lens of key system information.”79 They 
are able to access a far greater number of cases on a wider array of topics. 
And—most importantly for the present discussion—the emphasis is now on 
“words over concepts.”80 As one scholar put it, most lawyers now “spend day 
 
74 See People v. Cheek, No. H031164, 2008 WL 5263647, at *23 n.11 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 
2008) (citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002)). 
75 See Robert Berring, On Not Throwing Out the Baby: Planning the Future of Legal Information, 
83 CALIF. L. REV. 615, 618-22 (describing the massive overhaul of legal information from paper to 
online); Kuh, supra note 9, at 225 (“In this new age of electronically manufactured law, the raw 
materials of law—case texts—increasingly reside in digital form and are studied by legal research-
ers using digital means.”). 
76 See Paul Hellyer, Assessing the Influence of Computer-Assisted Legal Research: A Study of Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Opinions, 97 LAW LIBR. J. 285, 286-88 (2005) (recounting the history of 
computer-assisted legal research). 
77 For a detailed description of print-based research, see Kuh, supra note 9, at 241-42. 
78 Id. at 242. 
79 Id. at 243. 
80 See Stinson, supra note 8, at 253 (“[E]lectronic word searching emphasizes, by its very 
nature, particular words over concepts.” (footnote omitted)).  
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after day in ‘Google-search’ mode—looking for answers to their questions 
by typing a word or short phrase into a search box.”81 They “pay less 
attention to the reasoning, theory and policy that drive a decision,” and, 
instead, they “prioritize speed” and the ability to find “a kernel of phraseol-
ogy that may support their often incorrect preconceived notions.”82 
Several scholars, particularly law librarians, have observed how this 
change is negatively impacting legal reasoning, although they lament that 
their warnings are falling on “deaf ears.”83 These scholars argue that fewer 
people read full cases anymore (or even case summaries),84 that it is easier 
for researchers to find just what they are looking for and nothing more 
(exacerbating confirmation bias),85 and that the distinction between hold-
ings and dicta is eroding.86  
A common thread in these warnings is that keyword searching perpetu-
ates a misunderstanding of context. Lawyers now look “for isolated word 
combinations,” causing a fear that the words they find may seem relevant to 
their argument but do not tell the whole story of the case in which they 
were uttered.87 It is very tempting just “to locate language in an opinion 
that, on its face, supports a particular position, even when the case itself 
does not stand for that proposition.”88 This tendency led Molly Lien to 
 
81 Id. at 250. 
82 Molly W. Lien, Technocentrism and the Soul of the Common Law Lawyer, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 
85, 89 (1998). 
83 See Kuh, supra note 9, at 226 (“Scholars, anthropologists and law librarians caution that the 
shift from print to electronic research will significantly impact the law in myriad ways. To date, 
however, these predictions and warnings have fallen on deaf ears.”); see also Robert Berring, Legal 
Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1673, 1706-07 (2000) 
(describing the potential future of legal research as one where “the researcher accords cognitive 
authority to the search system” and relies on “the algorithm that drives the system” instead of her 
own analytical skill); Barbara Bintliff, From Creativity to Computerese: Thinking Like a Lawyer in the 
Computer Age, 88 LAW. LIBR. J. 338, 342, 345 (1996) (explaining the change in our legal research 
habits, from one that began with “the specific point of law” to one that begins with “distilling this 
information into a computer search strategy” based on “words or short phrases”).  
84 See Kuh, supra note 9, at 246; Lien, supra note 82, at 130-32. 
85 See Thomas L. Fowler, Holding, Dictum . . . Whatever, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 139, 141 (2003) 
(noting the temptation legal researchers face when they see “a sentence that says what [they] want 
it to say” to “conclude that [their] research is done”); Kuh, supra note 9, at 254-55. 
86 Stinson, supra note 8, at 260 (“Regardless of how one defines holding (and therefore dic-
ta), it is clear that judges and lawyers routinely confuse the two.”). 
87 Lien, supra note 82, at 130-31; see also Carol M. Bast & Ransford C. Pyle, Legal Research in 
the Computer Age: A Paradigm Shift?, 93 LAW LIBR. J. 285, 297 (2001) (suggesting that the computer 
based legal researcher—as opposed to the print researcher—starts with facts and finds cases with 
facts similar to his own without appreciating different contexts). 
88 Stinson, supra note 8, at 222. 
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argue that just as television created “‘sound bite’ journalism,” so does 
computerized legal research create “‘law-byte’ reasoning.”89  
It is not hard to see how this new research method can lead to factual 
precedents. For one thing, the sheer number of cases to research has vastly 
expanded. Who cares, for example, about the difference between un-
published and published opinions when both are available on Westlaw and 
are easily retrieved through the same word search?90 With more cases to 
research, it is now easier to find cases with similar facts (even seemingly 
obscure ones): “[R]esearch in print sources inclines one toward legal 
principles while keyword searching is more apt to generate groups of cases 
based on similarities of facts.”91 Instead of the old way of starting with the 
legal principle and identifying cases on topic that have similar facts, search 
strategies now run backwards: we look for factually similar language first 
and devise the rules after.92  
 Putting aside whether this is a good shift in emphasis or not, the mod-
ern way we engage in legal research makes a prior court’s factual statements 
easier to find and easier to use in legal arguments later. Anything any judge 
or justice has ever said about any topic (neuroscience, climate change, 
psychological harm from rape) is only a click of the mouse away.93 
 
89 Lien, supra note 82, at 88. 
90 See F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has Transformed the 
Law, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 563, 579 (2002) (explaining how even unpublished opinions are now 
available online and, thus, able to be used as precedents). 
91 Id. at 583; see also Margolis, supra note 6, at 935 (“[E]lectronic search technology pushes 
the researcher to focus on facts rather than legal concepts.”). Some say the extension of potential 
precedents with relevant facts leads to better legal arguments, but the expansion is not recognized 
as a universal good. In Great Britain, for example, there is a concerted effort to stop publication of 
cases with redundant legal principles (even if the facts are the same). These British efforts, 
however, have been only moderately successful in the Internet age. In recent years, the number of 
unpublished cases becoming digitally available in Great Britain has dramatically increased. See 
Hanson, supra note 90, at 565-66. 
92 Margolis, supra note 6, at 935 (“Without an understanding of how the source fits into the 
broad context of legal analysis, the researcher is likely to focus more on the factual content of the 
information.”). 
93 I acknowledge that the digital revolution also makes it easier for lower courts to access 
factual sources without resorting to the ones cited in the U.S. Reports. The fact that these courts 
are still citing the Justices’ endorsement of factual claims (as opposed to just the underlying 
sources themselves), however, suggests that something more than information access is motivating 
their search for authorities. For more discussion on this point, see infra Section III.B. 
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2. “Fatter” Supreme Court Opinions 
Enter the second relevant change that leads to factual precedents: the 
look and feel of judicial opinions, particularly those of the Supreme Court, 
are changing. Opinions are longer.94 They include more citations than ever 
before.95 And—of particular relevance for the present discussion—there is a 
new emphasis on factual claims reinforced by empirical data and secondary 
authorities.96 As a result, the information pool of available Supreme Court 
factual observations has greatly expanded. 
Perhaps because we can all access infinite information on our phones, 
there is a new hunger for empirical support in judicial decisions and legal 
arguments. There is also a wide-open field of data to support that demand.97 
Fred Schauer and Virginia Wise observed over ten years ago that the advent 
of computers has led to an increasing number of citations of “nonlegal” 
sources in Supreme Court opinions.98 There is no evidence that the trend is 
losing steam.99  
Consequently, the factual dimensions of arguments—particularly legisla-
tive facts—are taking center stage. This “widespread empirical turn”100 is 
particularly visible in Supreme Court decisions, but this trend is not limited 
there.101 In fact one commentator has observed that there is a new tendency 
 
94 See Black & Spriggs, supra note 3, at 645, 663 fig.7 (documenting the Court’s “general 
increase in opinion length”). 
95 See Cross et al., supra note 5, at 532 fig.1 (charting an increase in the number of case cita-
tions in U.S. Supreme Court opinions over time).  
96 I am not alone in noticing this trend. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 58, at 550 (“Increasingly, com-
mentators and litigants are checking the modern Court’s fact-finding on the basis of empirical 
research that only sometimes supports, and often contradicts, the Court’s ‘best guesses’ about the 
world.”); Meares, supra note 6, at 851 (“Recent studies show that, over the past decade, judges and 
lawyers have begun to cite to empirical studies in their work with increasing regularity.”); Zick, 
supra note 6, at 129 (describing and critiquing the increased use of empirical methods and data to 
decide constitutional cases).  
97 See Schauer & Wise, supra note 45, at 497 (stating that “[s]ince 1990, the Supreme Court’s 
citation of nonlegal sources has increased dramatically”); see also Berring, supra note 83, at 1690 
(“Today’s Court can turn to a world of sources from all corners of scholarship . . . .”); id. at 1689 
(“Hundreds of cases are cited, but so are authorities from all corners of the information galaxy.”). 
98 See Berring, supra note 83, at 1683-89 (noting that a review of the 1899 U.S. Reports shows 
the Court relying on statutes, cases, and the record below but little else, whereas a review of the 
1999 U.S. Reports shows “an infinite universe” of authorities); Wes Daniels, “Far Beyond the Law 
Reports”: Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions October Terms 1900, 
1940, and 1978, 76 LAW LIBR. J. 1, 4 (1983) (noting a significant increase in the Supreme Court’s 
use of secondary sources over the twentieth century). 
99 See Margolis, supra note 6, at 937 (noting the rise in internet citations and citations to 
nonlegal authorities in judicial opinions). 
100 Zick, supra note 6. 
101 See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 90, at 587-88 (showing samples from the New Jersey Supreme 
Court with similar patterns); Hellyer, supra note 76, at 293-94 tbls.1-2 (noting that the highest 
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of lower courts to “mimic” the style of the Supreme Court102—including the 
way the Justices tell long narratives that are peppered with facts. As Second 
Circuit Judge Leval has characterized: “[W]ith the central role courts have 
increasingly played in resolving important social questions, we have come to 
see ourselves as something considerably grander—as lawgivers, teachers, 
fonts of wisdom, even keepers of the national conscience. This change of 
image has helped transform dicta from trivia into a force.”103 
There is no reason to think factual precedents are limited to Supreme 
Court factual claims (as opposed to lower courts quoting language coming 
from courts in other jurisdictions). This Article, however, limits its discus-
sion of factual precedents to citations in the U.S. Reports because of the 
attention those opinions draw across jurisdictions and because the Supreme 
Court—perhaps more than any other court—gives reasons for its decisions 
that are rich with factual assertions.  
One more change to Supreme Court opinions merits consideration. The 
emphasis on empiricism and the ease with which information can be 
accessed means Justices are not just making bald factual claims about the 
world; instead, their claims are commonly backed up with supporting 
evidence from numerous sources, such as law review articles, medical 
journals, newspapers, and websites, to name a few.104 Some speculate this is 
due to the increased role of law clerks, who—as Judge Posner famously put 
it—“feel naked” without an authority to quote and cite.105 But whatever the 
reason, the Court’s factual statements about the world are now commonly 
accompanied by nonlegal authorities.106  
 
court in California is handing down longer opinions, citing more cases, and relying on more 
secondary authorities than ever before, but concluding that there is not enough evidence to 
attribute the changes to computer-based legal research alone). 
102 Stinson, supra note 8, at 221-22. 
103 Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 
1256 (2006). 
104 For a collection of authorities the Court uses to support its factual claims, see generally 
my prior work on the subject. Larsen, supra note 7. 
105 Judge Posner explained, “Law clerks, however, feel naked unless they are quoting and 
citing cases and other authorities.” RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE 
AND REFORM 148 (1996). 
106 In Roe v. Wade, for example, the Court asserted without citation that “[m]aternity, or 
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future . . . . Mental and 
physical health may be taxed by child care.” 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). The Court just left it at that. 
By contrast, more recently, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court made the same observation and 
followed it with fourteen citations to fact-based authorities, from medical journals to New York 
Times Magazine articles to briefing papers from the American Psychiatric Association. 550 U.S. 
124, 183 n.7 (2007). See also Schauer & Wise, supra note 45, at 497, for documentation on the rise 
of nonlegal authorities in Supreme Court opinions. 
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Why is that change relevant? It is quite possible that the addition of a 
factual authority makes a Justice’s statement seem more precedent worthy 
and, therefore, more likely to be true or safer for a lower court to cite. To 
evoke a familiar analogy, when a law professor makes a claim about physics 
in an article, a dutiful law review editor will ask her for a footnote. That 
editor takes comfort if the physics footnote comes from another law review 
article, even if that second law professor has no relevant expertise with 
physics.  
Likewise, a statistical study on neuroscience or climate change, if ap-
proved by the U.S. Supreme Court, can seem safely vetted to a lower court 
that knows nothing about the subject. Authority from a familiar source can 
be persuasive even if it is misplaced.107 And the question for the day is 
whether the confidence lower courts place in Supreme Court factfinding is 
appropriate.  
II. EXAMPLES OF FACTUAL PRECEDENTS 
So exactly which Supreme Court factual statements are repeated by lower 
courts and for what purpose are they being used? The following Part 
attempts to answer that question with a list of illustrative examples.  
Bear in mind there are two variables at play in an in-depth exploration 
of factual precedents: (1) the way the Supreme Court used the fact originally, 
and (2) the way a lower court reuses it later. As I have detailed elsewhere, 
Supreme Court Justices use generalized facts in many different ways: to set 
the stage, to highlight the importance of an issue, to refute or underscore an 
argument with empirical ammunition, and sometimes to answer a disposi-
tive question in the case.108 Lower courts follow suit; they use facts with the 
same variation, and they do so by citing language from Supreme Court 
opinions as authority—often without regard to how the Court employed the 
fact originally.  
To narrow the focus of the present discussion, let us hold one variable 
constant or rather put one type of factual precedent to the side. I exclude 
from my discussion examples of lower courts citing facts to tell a narrative 
or to anchor a discussion with rhetorical flourish. For example, several lower 
courts cite the Supreme Court for the fact that the Food and Drug Administration 
 
107 See Schauer, supra note 1, at 1943 (“As with the parent saying, ‘Because I said so,’ authority is 
in an important way the fallback position when substantive persuasion is ineffective.”). 
108 I have previously provided illustrations of these different uses of Supreme Court facts. 
See generally Larsen, supra note 7. 
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(FDA) is an understaffed agency with limited resources.109 They do this for 
rhetorical purposes: to show the need for drug manufacturers to monitor 
the safety of their own products. But the fact that the FDA is understaffed 
likely is not the lynchpin in these decisions, or at least the opinions do not 
read as if this fact were outcome-determinative. It seems less controversial 
that lower courts would use language from Supreme Court opinions in this 
way. 
I therefore do not discuss a lower court’s gratuitous use of factual prece-
dents. Instead, the examples below are all factual precedents somehow used 
to address dispositive questions that the lower court must answer before 
resolving the case.110 Put bluntly, these examples are not window-dressing 
factual precedents; they are citations to the Supreme Court for facts that 
matter.111 It is perhaps more surprising that lower courts use Supreme Court 
factual assertions in this way, but it is not at all rare.  
There are surely many types of factual precedent—many ways a lower 
court can reuse factual language from a higher court. Examples are plenti-
ful, but the ones I discuss below are organized into five categories: “import-
ed factual precedents” (facts imported from one context to another); 
“strategic factual precedents” (facts to supplement the record for a calculat-
ed purpose); “aftermath factual precedents” (facts from a landmark opinion 
used by a lower court to answer residual questions); “historical factual 
precedents” (facts about how the world existed in a prior time); and “prem-
ise facts” (facts that form the premise of a legal rule).  
These categories are not meant to be exhaustive nor are they mutually 
exclusive. I offer them purely for the ease of explaining the typical ways that 
lower courts are using Supreme Court factual assertions as authorities to 
decide outcome-determinative questions in the cases before them. 
 
109 See, e.g., Lefaivre v. KV Pharm. Co., 636 F.3d 935, 940 (8th Cir. 2011); Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 
593 F.3d 428, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2010). 
110 Of course, a reader of judicial opinions can never know for sure what influence the factual 
precedent had on the lower court’s decisionmaking process. In all of the following cases, however, 
the court cites a Supreme Court opinion for a factual proposition that it must answer to resolve 
the dispute. For reasons discussed further below, that is enough to cause alarm. 
111 As we shall see, on occasion, a lower court will reuse a Supreme Court fact to answer a 
dispositive question that was originally employed by a Justice only rhetorically as window-
dressing.  
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A. “Imported Factual Precedents”: Facts Imported from  
One Context to Another 
 Sometimes a lower court takes a factual claim made by a Supreme 
Court Justice in one context and uses it to make a different point in a 
separate context. These are what I call “imported factual precedents.” 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin provides an excellent example in a 
case called State v. Ninham.112 Omer Ninham was convicted of murder and 
sentenced to life in prison without parole. He was fourteen at the time of 
the murder, and Ninham argued that fourteen is too young to justify a life 
sentence without parole (a position eventually vindicated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in June 2012113). Ninham brought to the court’s attention 
psychological and neurological studies demonstrating that fourteen-year-
olds generally have immature brain development and are less capable of 
responsible decisionmaking.114  
The Wisconsin court rejected this factual claim because, “in other con-
texts, psychologists have promoted scientific evidence that arrives at the 
precise opposite conclusions about 14-year-olds.”115 In support, the court 
cited Justice Scalia’s dissent in Roper v. Simmons.116 Justice Scalia, in turn, 
cited an amicus brief filed by the American Psychological Association 
(APA) in a completely separate abortion case for the conclusion that 
“numerous psychological treatises and studies” demonstrated that “14 and 
15-year-old juveniles are mature enough to decide whether to obtain an 
abortion without parental involvement.”117 
Justice Scalia’s dissent, which relied on an amicus brief from an abortion 
case, is the only piece of counter evidence the Wisconsin court used to 
reject Ninham’s claim. This factual precedent does not come from a majority 
of the Supreme Court, was obviously used by Justice Scalia as a barb about 
the APA’s alleged inconsistency, and is based on studies that are at least 
twenty years old and were selected to make an entirely different point about 
juvenile maturity. It is hard to believe that the Wisconsin court read the 
APA studies in the abortion amicus brief, nor is it likely that the APA had 
any indication that the studies on brain development it highlighted in a 
 
112 797 N.W.2d 451 (Wis. 2011). 
113 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (holding that “mandatory life without 
parole” for those under eighteen at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment). 
114 Ninham, 797 N.W.2d at 478-79. 
115 Id. at 473. 
116 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for juvenile 
offenders).  
117 Ninham, 797 N.W.2d at 473 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 617-18) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Supreme Court abortion brief in 1990 would be used twenty-one years later 
by a lower court to justify a juvenile life sentence without parole.  
Wisconsin jurists are not alone in importing facts from Supreme Court 
opinions into new contexts. In a 2011 multiparty insurance dispute, a district 
court in West Virginia was asked to interpret a “bodily injury exclusion” to 
an insurance policy.118 The court had to decide whether two women who 
were sexually molested by an employee had suffered “bodily injuries” under 
West Virginia law. The court held that “while the trauma of sexual assault 
and sexual abuse cannot be understated, the injuries resulting from a sexual 
assault are often largely emotional.”119 For support, it cited a law review 
article and the majority opinion from the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. 
Louisiana.120 The district court quoted language from Kennedy that rape has 
a permanent emotional and sometimes physical impact on the victim.121 The 
district court italicized the word “sometimes” and used the quote to empha-
size that rape is more often emotionally damaging as opposed to physically 
damaging.122  
In this example, the lower court not only imported a fact to a new context, 
but it also gave it a new emphasis. In Kennedy, the Supreme Court invalidat-
ed the death penalty as a punishment for someone who rapes a child.123 The 
language picked up by the district court came from Justice Kennedy as he 
expressed sympathy for the victim in the case.124 The studies in question on 
the emotional trauma of rape came from the book The Search for Healing. It 
is hard to believe that either Justice Kennedy or the authors of those studies 
expected that their words would later be used to downplay the likelihood of 
rape’s physical damage.  
Once one starts to look for them, examples of imported factual prece-
dents are everywhere. They include: data on brain development originally 
cited in a Supreme Court case discussing juvenile offenders and subsequently 
 
118 See Charleston Area Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins., No. 09-0573, 2011 WL 2161534, at 
*1, *7 (S.D. W. Va. June 1, 2011) (finding that an insurer failed to demonstrate that a policyholder’s 
claim fell under the bodily injury exclusion). 
119 Id. at *8.  
120 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
121 Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 2011 WL 2161534 at *8 n.10. 
122 The district court used this assertion from the Supreme Court to supplement its review 
of the record and in order to conclude that no bodily injury took place in the case before it. Id. 
123 554 U.S. at 446-47. 
124 Id. at 435 (“Rape has a permanent psychological, emotional, and sometimes physical im-
pact on the child.” (citing CHRISTOPHER BAGLEY & KATHLEEN KING, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: 
THE SEARCH FOR HEALING 2-24, 111-12 (1990))). 
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used to justify striking down an overbroad speech restriction by a university;125 
statistics on mild cases of carpal tunnel syndrome originally collected by 
Justice O’Connor in an American with Disabilities Act case and subsequent-
ly used to justify a ruling for the defense under a different statute;126 and 
information about GPS tracking technology from Justice Alito’s concur-
rence in United States v. Jones, which was later used by a trial court to 
suppress evidence gained from a different technology that enables police to 
see the basic geographic location where cell phone calls are made.127  
As explained above, new digital research modes make these factual 
claims from Supreme Court decisions easy to find. It does not seem to 
matter if the studies or statistics were assembled in the same context, used 
with the same emphasis, or have subsequently been repudiated by newer 
findings. 
B. “Strategic Factual Precedents”: Facts to Supplement the  
Record for a Calculated Purpose 
The next category of factual precedents should not be surprising given 
human nature. As anyone who has ever written a high school term paper can 
confirm, it is very tempting for an author to use facts the way “drunks use 
lampposts . . . more for support and not illumination.”128 A judge, in other 
words, can use factual precedents strategically—not to inform herself about 
the world, but to bolster a preexisting view with something to cite. I call 
this a “strategic factual precedent.”129 
 
125 McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 253 (3d Cir. 2010). 
126 Artega v. Brink’s, Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 654, 671 (2008) (citing Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), for the proposition that “[s]tudies have further 
shown that, even without surgical treatment, one quarter of carpal tunnel cases resolve in one 
month,” and using that finding to hold that a mere diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome does not 
mean that the plaintiff was disabled during employment and entitled to relief under the Fair 
Employment and Housing Act). 
127 See Commonwealth v. Pitt, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 445, 447 (Super. Ct. 2012) (“[S]ociety’s 
expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not . . . secretly monitor and 
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.” (citing Justice 
Alito’s concurrence in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012))); see also Lomack v. City of 
Newark, No. 04-6085, 2005 WL 2077479, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2005) (using social science data 
originally relied upon in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), for the importance of diversity 
in the law school classroom to justify an affirmative action program designed for firefighters), 
rev’d, 463 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2006).  
128 See Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8 (quoting Second Circuit Judge Robert D. Sack). 
129 Many of the other categories I have identified overlap with this one. An imported prece-
dent, for example, can also be a strategic one.  
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A great example of a strategic factual precedent is an example and a 
counterexample all in one. In Amigos Bravos v. U.S. Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, environmental groups sued to challenge a federal agency’s approval of 
oil and gas lease sales.130 The question before the district court was whether 
those groups had standing to proceed.131 The plaintiffs argued that they 
were injured because the agency’s decision led to an increased risk of 
environmental harm due to climate change.132 They cited the “clear scien-
tific consensus” of climate change documented by the Supreme Court in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.133 This was not enough, however, for the district court: 
“At this stage of the litigation, plaintiffs must come forward with more than 
just bare assertions of perceived climate change.”134 Accordingly, the data 
gleaned from Justice Stevens’s opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA was insuffi-
cient to create an injury in fact—no factual precedent. 
Several pages later, however, the district court sang a different tune. 
When it arrived at the causation prong of its standing analysis—the ques-
tion of whether climate change (if true) could be caused by the defendant’s 
conduct—the court then cited statistics pulled from Massachusetts v. EPA on 
the relative paucity of the U.S. transportation sector’s contribution to global 
warming.135 In other words, the facts from Massachusetts v. EPA bound the 
lower court when that court wanted to be bound but did not pose an 
obstacle when the court wanted to ignore them.  
A similar strategic use of a factual precedent is to declare an issue settled 
when it is not obviously so. In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the 
Supreme Court upheld an Indiana law that required voters to present photo 
identification.136 The state justification behind the law was to prevent in-
person voter fraud. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, acknowledged 
that there was slim evidence of in-person voter fraud on the record in Indiana, 
but he reasoned that the theoretical possibility of such conduct justified the 
law.137  
A year following Crawford, litigation emerged in New Jersey over similar 
“ballot security” initiatives.138 The Republicans argued that the measures 
 
130 816 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D.N.M. 2011). 
131 Id. at 1123. 
132 Id. at 1123-24.  
133 Id. at 1127 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521-23 (2007)). 
134 Id. at 1128. 
135 Id. at 1136. 
136 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008). 
137 Id. 
138 Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d 575 (2009). 
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were justified because of the real risk of in-person voter fraud, and the 
Democrats countered that cries of such fraud were exaggerated and that the 
security led to voter intimidation. Currently, there is a robust debate among 
election law scholars and empiricists about whether in-person voter fraud 
actually happens today.139 Indeed, the New Jersey District Court received 
“mountains of documentary evidence” from both sides on precisely that 
factual question.140 
The court resolved the controversy not by relying on the evidence it 
admitted, but by closely scrutinizing the separate opinions in Crawford. It 
cited Justice Souter’s dissent for the fact that in-person voter fraud is very 
rare (citing studies to that effect).141 Next, it inspected the three footnotes 
from Justice Stevens in which he provided examples of voter fraud that were 
“documented by respected historians.”142 After debunking Justice Stevens’s 
examples and counting the number of Justices who signed on to the dissent, 
the New Jersey District Court declared that  
the rulings by Justices Stevens and Souter in Crawford refute the RNC’s 
argument that in-person voter fraud poses a danger to the integrity of mod-
ern elections . . . . Five Justices—a binding majority of the Court—
joined in those Opinions. Accordingly, it is settled that in-person fraud is 
extremely rare, and any argument . . . to the contrary must be rejected.143  
Thus, the New Jersey District Court declared that the Justices of the 
U.S. Supreme Court would be the final arbiters of this ongoing debate 
instead of examining the record before it about the existence of voter fraud 
in its state. It made this decision despite the fact that the Justices were clear 
 
139 Compare JOHN FUND, STEALING ELECTIONS: HOW VOTER FRAUD THREATENS OUR 
DEMOCRACY 6 (2004) (“Election fraud whether it’s phony voter registrations, illegal absentee 
ballots, shady recounts or old-fashioned ballot-box stuffing can be found in every part of the 
United States.”), and Hans A. von Spakovsky, Stolen Identities, Stolen Votes: A Case Study in Voter 
Impersonation, LEGAL MEMORANDUM, Mar. 10, 2008, at 1, 1 (“Contrary to claims made by 
prominent newspapers and attorneys, in person voting fraud is a real problem.”), with Justin 
Levitt, Election Deform: The Pursuit of Unwarranted Electoral Regulation, 11 ELECTION L.J. 97, 110 
(2012) (“[A]ll of the available evidence demonstrates that the incidence of any fraud that 
identification rules could prevent is extraordinarily rare.”), and Richard L. Hasen, Fraud Reform?, 
SLATE MAG. (Feb. 22, 2006), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/ 
2006/02/fraud_reform.html (“Beyond a few isolated instances and anecdotes, there is precious 
little evidence of the kind of voter fraud a state voter ID card requirement would deter.”).  
140 Democratic Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 578. 
141 Id. at 608. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 609-10 (footnote omitted). 
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in Crawford that their decision was based solely on the Indiana record before 
them.144 
It is worth noting that although a lower court may be reticent to cite a 
dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court as legal precedent, the same 
reluctance does not hold true for facts. Factual precedents often involve 
language from concurring and dissenting Supreme Court opinions. Justice 
Thomas’s dissent in Grutter, for example, reciting evidence on the benefit of 
historically black colleges to African American student success, has been 
relied on by a district court to uphold a race-conscious admissions policy of 
an all Native Hawaiian school.145 Justice Breyer’s concurrence “document-
ing” the increased rate of race-based stereotypes in jury selection was used 
by the Seventh Circuit to justify finding a Batson violation in a state’s use of 
preemptory strikes.146 And statistics from a Justice Ginsburg dissent that 
found that students who participated in extracurricular activities were less 
likely to do drugs were used by two different lower courts to strike down 
the drug-testing policies for school sports as underinclusive, simply because 
they did not target “student slackers.”147 One of those courts, in fact, used 
the statistics to rebut contrary evidence on the record given by the school 
therapist who ran the drug diversion program.148 
At a bare minimum, the popularity of strategic factual precedents reveals 
the lack of uniformity in the lower courts about the proper authoritative 
force Supreme Court facts should carry. The current rule seems to be to use 
them when it is convenient and to avoid them when it is not. 
 
144 This use of Crawford by the lower courts is particularly worrisome given a recent state-
ment by Justice Stevens on the issue. After Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit opinion writer in 
Crawford, recently announced that he made a mistake in the case, Justice Stevens told a reporter 
that he too harbored doubts about whether voter ID laws actually deter voter fraud: “My opinion 
should not be taken as authority that voter-ID laws are always OK. . . . The decision in the case is 
state-specific and record specific.” See Jess Bravin, Voter-ID Laws Worry Jurist, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 
17, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304384104579141701228734132.  
145 See Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1169 (D. 
Haw. 2003) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 364-65 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).  
146 See United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 515 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Miller-El v. Dret-
ke, 545 U.S. 231, 270 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
147 See Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 836 A.2d 76, 92 (Pa. 2003) (citing Bd. of Ed. of 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 853 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting)); see also Brown v. Shasta Union High Sch. Dist., No. C061972, 2010 WL 3442147, at 
*11 n.13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Earls, 536 U.S. at 853). 
148 Brown, 2010 WL 3442147, at *11. 
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C. “Aftermath Factual Precedents”: Facts to Answer Residual Questions 
 Following Landmark Legal Decisions 
If strategic factual precedents are used the way “drunks use lamp-
posts”—for support only—one is left to wonder if there are any “sober” 
examples of lower courts using Supreme Court facts. Of course, it is 
impossible to know for sure what influence any authority has on a judge, but 
there is one particular type of Supreme Court fact that lower courts seem to 
carefully scrutinize for “illumination” purposes. 
 When the Supreme Court issues a landmark decision, it often reserves fol-
low-up questions for a later day. This inevitably spawns litigation on these 
residual questions, and, it turns out, lower courts look to what the Justices 
originally said about the relevant facts to predict how they might answer the 
new legal question. Lower courts will readily admit that the new question 
was not addressed by the Supreme Court; nonetheless, they claim that the 
Justices have “winked at the issue.”149 I call this use of factual claims “after-
math factual precedents.” 
Two prominent examples of aftermath factual precedents come to mind. 
The first group of cases follows the Supreme Court’s decision in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, which held that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual’s right to own a firearm for lawful purposes.150 Following this 
landmark decision, lower courts were confronted with many new legal 
questions, such as: Is the right to possess a firearm fundamental so that it 
should be incorporated against the states?151 Does the Second Amendment 
protect the right to own weapons not at issue in Heller (like air pistols or 
knifes)?152 And, does the Second Amendment invalidate other laws crimi-
nalizing certain gun possession?153 The Supreme Court specifically made 
 
149 People v. Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 n.1 (City Ct. of Watertown 2010), abrogated by 
People v. Pealer, 985 N.E.2d 903 (N.Y. 2013). In Carreira, a New York court found a DUI breath 
test to be inadmissible. Id. The court relied on a study about the manipulation of forensic evidence 
highlighted by the Supreme Court. Id. (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318-
19 (2009)). It applied the study’s findings to the facts at hand, while admitting that the Melendez-
Diaz Court did not apply its holding to testing records. The Supreme Court instead “wink[ed] at 
the issue” and “excruciatingly avoid[ed]” it. Id. 
150 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
151 See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 446 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e must decide whether 
the Second Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth [Amendment], a question 
that Heller explicitly left open.”). 
152 See, e.g., Wooden v. United States, 6 A.3d 833, 839 (D.C. 2010) (“[W]e cannot find it 
‘plain’—‘clear’ or ‘obvious’—that the Heller Court would extend its ruling to knives.”); People v. 
Nivar, 915 N.Y.S.2d 801, 808-10 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (determining that air pistols were not defined 
within the ambiguous definition of Heller). 
153 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1164-68 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) 
(evaluating whether the Heller decision extended to all laws restricting firearm ownership). 
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clear that it was not addressing some of these questions in Heller, while 
others it just ignored.154 
As post-Heller litigation made its way through the lower courts, the Supreme 
Court’s historical account of how and why the Second Amendment was 
adopted (which is, after all, a question of fact) became very important in 
answering follow-up legal questions. One plaintiff, for example, challenged 
a New York law banning air pistols (which differed from the handgun ban at 
issue in Heller).155 The trial court first recited the Heller majority’s historical 
account of what eighteenth-century citizens thought “arms” meant, and then 
it concluded that air pistols were not arms because they are not used in self-
defense as members of the founding generation had assumed their arms to 
be.156 The lower court did not rely on the holding of Heller, but its historical 
evidence came straight from the U.S. Reports. 
Other courts looked to the facts contained in the Heller dissent for guid-
ance in answering these aftermath legal questions. In a constitutional 
challenge to the federal statute prohibiting firearm possession by felons, a 
district court in Tennessee cited statistics on gun violence from Justice 
Breyer’s Heller dissent in order to establish that the government’s interest 
behind the law is “not only ‘legitimate,’ but also ‘important.’”157  
Finally, the historical facts in Heller were also used by at least one lower 
court to anticipate the obvious follow-up legal question (later answered by 
the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Chicago158) about whether the Second 
Amendment should be incorporated against the states. To answer that 
question, the Ninth Circuit explained that “Heller reveals evidence . . . 
[that] the right to keep and bear arms shares ancestry” with other funda-
mental rights.159 It uses Heller’s description of the “behavior and words of 
the colonists” to demonstrate the importance of the right and ultimately to 
conclude from the Court’s “survey of our history” that the right to bear 
arms is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”160  
The point is not to criticize the Supreme Court’s historical account, but 
merely to note that the history mounted in Heller to answer one question 
was then used subsequently by lower courts to answer separate legal questions 
 
154 Heller, 554 U.S. at 681. 
155 Nivar, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 802-03. 
156 Id. at 808-09. 
157 Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 (citation omitted). 
158 561 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment should be incorporated 
against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
159 Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 451-52 (9th Cir. 2009).  
160 Id. at 452-54. 
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that followed. The Court’s historical work, in other words, serves two 
purposes: to answer today’s legal question in the U.S. Reports and tomor-
row’s legal question in the Federal Reporter. 
A second example of aftermath factual precedents involves questions 
that followed the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia banning the 
execution of individuals who are “mentally retarded.”161 Justice Stevens, 
writing for the Atkins majority, specifically left it to the states to define 
“mental retardation” for purposes of applying the death penalty.162 Although 
he declined to set a national definition, however, Justice Stevens did have 
words to say on the subject.163 In explaining the defense’s evidence that 
Atkins was “mildly mentally retarded,” Justice Stevens referred to defini-
tions from the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) and 
the American Psychiatric Association (APA).164 Although the AAMR’s 
definition had eliminated the classification based on IQ score, the APA 
definition still retained it.165 Thus, Justice Stevens combined both authori-
ties and explained: “[M]ental retardation require[s] not only subaverage 
intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills.”166 
He further noted that the “cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function” of a 
mentally retarded person is “between 70 and 75 or lower.”167 
Following Atkins, whether or not someone qualifies as mentally retarded 
can literally be a question of life and death. As documented by Peggy 
Tobolowsky, “assessment procedures vary considerably” by state; some are 
set by statute, while others are set by court decision.168 This variation has 
spawned many challenges to the adequacy of any given state’s rule on how 
much mental evaluation is necessary. Prisoners often seek additional 
evidentiary hearings on their mental state.169  
Interestingly, to answer these challenges, some lower courts have relied 
on the dicta in Atkins about the definition of mental retardation—even 
though Justice Stevens specifically disclaimed settling the issue.170 These 
 
161 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
162 Id. at 317. 
163 Id. at 308. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 308 n.3. 
166 Id. at 318. 
167 Id. at 309 n.5. 
168 See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders and 
Excluding Them from Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 78, 102 (2003) (noting that ten of the twenty capital 
punishment states have legislatively or judicially adopted procedures to implement Atkins and that 
these procedures require varying degrees of expert input and evaluation). 
169 Id. at 138-40. 
170 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-18. 
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courts quote Justice Stevens for the proposition that the IQ test is the 
“standard instrument” for assessing mental retardation, and then they use 
that language about the IQ cutoff to deny requests for additional clinical 
assessment.171  
Death penalty scholars and psychologists have warned that strict adher-
ence to an IQ test alone does not adequately measure mental retardation—
particularly without reference to the standard measurement of error of these 
tests.172 In addition, the AAMR—the authority relied on by the Atkins 
Court—now specifically “cautions against the use of a fixed cutoff point 
regarding IQ scores in the determination of mental retardation.”173 But 
whether those arguments are right or wrong is not the point. What matters 
instead is that lower courts are using dicta in landmark decisions to answer 
follow-up questions specifically reserved by the Supreme Court for another 
day. They are, in effect, attributing precedential power to language not 
meant to be precedential. 
D. Historical Factual Precedents 
One special brand of factual precedent merits a pause: the “historical 
factual precedent.” This precedent is evident when courts invoke what the 
Supreme Court has said about history without re-examining the relevant 
historical account. 
 
171 See, e.g., Hearn v. Thaler, 669 F.3d 265, 273 (5th Cir. 2012) (stating that “relying primarily 
on the [full-scale] IQ tests here is reasonable and more likely to result in consistent mental 
retardation determinations because the tests have been widely acknowledged as ‘the standard 
instrument in the United States for assessing intellectual functioning’”); Thomas v. Quarterman, 
335 F. App’x 386, 391 (5th Cir. 2009) (same); Carroll v. Crosby, No. 05-0857, 2008 WL 2557555, 
at *15 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2008) (denying prisoner’s request for evidentiary hearing on mental 
retardation and upholding the trial court’s conclusion that he was not mentally retarded based 
upon “a reasonable application of the Atkins criteria”). 
172 See Tobolowsky, supra note 168, at 139 (“[S]tates that use a rigid IQ cutoff score of seven-
ty for the intellectual functioning component may be excluding some individuals otherwise falling 
within the accepted clinical definition.”); see also John M. Fabian et al., Life, Death, and IQ: It’s 
Much More Than Just a Score, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 399, 413 (2011) (pointing out the standard 
deviation in IQ tests, and arguing that the APA never intended to enshrine an IQ cutoff for 
mental retardation); Geraldine W. Young, A More Intelligent and Just Atkins: Adjusting for the Flynn 
Effect in Capital Determinations of Mental Retardation or Intellectual Disability, 65 VAND. L. REV. 615, 
617, 629 (2012) (describing “the Flynn effect” as the theory that IQ scores rise over time, and 
arguing that IQ cutoffs in Atkins determinations are therefore inaccurate and unjust); see generally 
Stephen J. Ceci et al., The Difficulty of Basing Death Penalty Eligibility on IQ Cutoff Scores for Mental 
Retardation, ETHICS & BEHAV., 2003, at 11, 12.  
173 Peggy M. Tobolowsky, A Different Path Taken: Texas Capital Offenders’ Post-Atkins Claims 
of Mental Retardation, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 75 (2011). 
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Examples of historical factual precedents are familiar.174 For instance, 
the Supreme Court’s explanation in Hans v. Louisiana175 of the origin of the 
Eleventh Amendment has sparked tremendous debate among historians and 
jurists as to its accuracy.176 Some historians suggest that the Hans Court 
strategically selected statements from the Framers to justify its historical 
account, ignoring original evidence to support the opposite constitutional 
understanding.177 Right or wrong, however, the Supreme Court’s history on 
the Eleventh Amendment is the only historical account on the subject that 
matters now because it is the one that binds lower courts for questions of 
state sovereign immunity.178  
To be sure, historical facts are unique creatures. Some say history is an 
interpretive act and not an assertion of fact at all. These scholars claim “it is 
not possible to know history scientifically . . . through the mere accumula-
tion of facts.”179 As Amy Kapczynski explains, “The central act of the 
historian is one of imagination, rather than recitation or excava-
tion . . . .”180 And yet others, like David Faigman, point out that original 
intent is “almost wholly fact based.”181 Questions of history, he tells us, boil 
 
174 One historical precedent showcased in constitutional law is the history of habeas corpus 
in pre-revolutionary England. For a detailed account of how one lopsided version of this history 
has oriented our understanding of the U.S. Constitution’s Suspension Clause, see Stephen I. 
Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2011) (reviewing PAUL D. 
HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010)).  
175 134 U.S. 1 (1890).  
176 See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 61, 68 (1989) (describing the “metamorphosis” of Eleventh Amendment interpreta-
tion that began with Hans); Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling 
Hans v. Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1260, 1271-72 (1990) (challenging the accuracy of the 
historical account in Hans); Michael G. Collins, The Conspiracy Theory of the Eleventh Amendment, 
88 COLUM. L. REV. 212, 232-34 (1988) (reviewing JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF 
THE UNITED STATES—THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987)) 
(discussing whether the Hans historical account was correct). 
177 See Collins, supra note 176, at 233.  
178 See David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 61, 71 (1984) (noting that the Court’s “ambiguous language” in Hans “has been 
folded into the eleventh amendment itself”); see also John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment 
and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1687 (2004) (“In particular, the 
Rehnquist Court has not merely adhered to Hans as a matter of stare decisis, but rather has 
continued to rely on its strongly purposive technique as a means to resolve unsettled questions 
about the very reach and implications of Hans and its progeny.”); Sherry, supra note 176, at 1261-63 
(discussing the stare decisis implications of Hans). For some examples of lower court cases that 
rely on the history as reported in Hans, see California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 
844 (9th Cir. 2004), and Employees of Department of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Public 
Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1971). 
179 Kapczynski, supra note 54, at 1043.  
180 Id. at 1051.  
181 FAIGMAN, supra note 11, at 46.  
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down to questions about what the Framers understood the word “arms” to 
mean, or whether the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended 
schools to remain segregated.182  
Although historical facts contain a strong element of interpretation, they 
still meet my working definition of a fact. Like other facts, historical 
accounts can be right or wrong, true or false. They, too, are supported by 
evidence from nonlegal sources. And, like other facts, historical accounts are 
used in various ways. Sometimes they form the backbone of legal rules and 
legal decisions (particularly those driven by originalism). But, “[m]ore 
likely,” as historian Paul Finkelman argues, “Justices will rummage around 
in history, looking for a factoid or some historical anecdote to support the 
outcome they want to reach.”183 In this sense, historical facts differ little 
from other factual claims. 
The precedential treatment of history in Supreme Court opinions is 
complicated because one needs to disentangle the precedential power of the 
legal rule (perhaps informed by historical facts) from the separate preceden-
tial force of the historical account itself.  
To understand the difference, consider the decision of the D.C. Circuit 
in United States v. Maple.184 There, a policeman had opened a closed com-
partment in Maple’s car to put away a cell phone, and he discovered a gun 
inside; the pivotal question was whether that “purely inadvertent” discovery 
by the officer constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.185  
To answer that question, the court looked to the Supreme Court’s his-
torical account of what the word “search” meant at the time the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted.186 It concluded that to search meant to “look over 
or through for the purpose of finding something.”187 The D.C. Circuit’s 
definition came from Kyllo v. United States.188 The D.C. Circuit was not 
citing the holding of Kyllo—indeed, it admitted that the “holding [was] not 
particularly relevant.”189 What mattered instead was purely the historical 
account in Kyllo and what the Justices said the word “search” meant to 
 
182 Id.  
183 Paul Finkelman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and History, 88 TEX. L. REV. 353, 356 
(2009) (reviewing LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE 
(2009), and PETER C. HOFFER, THE SUPREME COURT: AN ESSENTIAL HISTORY (2007)).  
184 334 F.3d 15 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
185 Id. at 20-21. 
186 Id. at 19. 
187 Id.  
188 Id. (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 n.1 (2001)). 
189 Id.  
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people living in 1787. The D.C. Circuit, in other words, relied on the 
Justices as historians rather than as a source of legal rules. 
Relying on the Justices as historians has its costs, however. Whatever the 
proper nature and precedential effect of historical facts may be, one thing is 
certain: on numerous occasions, historical accounts authored by Supreme 
Court Justices have been subsequently (and sometimes contemporaneously) 
refuted by world-class historians.  
Justice Black’s account of the original understanding of the Establish-
ment Clause in Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing 
provides one such example.190 Justice Black highlighted Thomas Jefferson’s 
phrase “separation of church and state” and claimed it was a widely accepted 
notion at the time of the nation’s founding.191 His account, however, has 
been generally debunked by religious historians who instead claim that the 
“wisdom and influence of Jefferson’s words regarding separation have 
developed largely as part of a twentieth-century myth—an account that has 
become popular precisely because it has seemed to provide constitutional 
authority for separation.”192  
Or, to take another example, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, Justice Story tells 
the tale of how the Fugitive Slave Clause developed as part of a sacred 
compromise that enabled the South to join the Union.193 Modern historians, 
such as Paul Finkelman, believe this account is flatly wrong.194 Likewise, 
Justice Taney’s retelling in Dred Scott v. Sandford195 of the Founding-era 
conceptions of free black citizenship is at the very least highly contestable, 
and, according to some historians, flies in the face of “overwhelming” 
evidence to the contrary.196  
The point, of course, is not to beat up on the Justices as amateur histori-
ans, but merely to highlight the costs that come with using the Supreme 
Court as the ultimate authority on history. Because the Supreme Court’s 
historical accounts are elevated in prestige, they become influential in and 
 
190 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
191 Id. at 16.  
192 PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 11 (2002). For a contem-
poraneous historical critique of Justice Black’s opinion, see Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court 
as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 5-6 (1949). 
193 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 540 (1842). 
194 See generally Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v Pennsylvania and 
Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247, 259-63 (1994) (telling “the real 
history of the fugitive slave clause”). 
195 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend 
XIV. 
196 See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERI-
CAN LAW AND POLITICS 349-54 (1978). 
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out of the courtroom.197 But these examples demonstrate that the Court is 
fallible when it interprets history, just like it is vulnerable with respect to 
other types of factfinding.  
E. “Premise Facts”: Facts that Form the Premise  
of a New Legal Rule 
I call the final type of factual precedent “premise facts”198 because they 
are beliefs about the state of the world that serve as the premise for a legal 
rule. All legislative facts share this characteristic to some extent, but some 
Supreme Court legal decisions fundamentally depend on a factual claim. In 
these cases, lower courts must determine whether the underlying fact itself 
is immune from challenges later.  
Two examples of constitutional premise facts come to mind: (1) the fac-
tual claim in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission that corporate 
independent expenditures do not corrupt politics,199 and (2) the factual 
claim in Grutter v. Bollinger that racially diverse viewpoints improve a law 
school education.200 In both cases, legislative facts were critical to the 
decision reached. And future lower courts, faced with subsequent litigation 
implementing the legal rules, must decide whether to give stare decisis 
effect to the factual aspects of the decisions or to reassess each factual claim 
according to the record of each case. They must decide, in other words, if a 
factual question remains open to challenge with new evidence or if it is 
effectively off the table after being settled by the Supreme Court. 
Citizens United and the litigation it spawned provide a great example. 
Citizens United evaluated a First Amendment challenge to the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act, which prohibited corporations from paying for 
independent electioneering communications shortly before elections.201 
 
197 See generally John H. Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme 
Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613, 613 (1954) (discussing the assumption of authoritative 
value attributed to sources cited by the California Supreme Court’s decisions; presumably, this 
assumption is even stronger for the U.S. Supreme Court). 
198 I borrow the phrase “premise facts” from Todd Aagaard’s fascinating administrative law 
article about such facts in agency statutory interpretation cases. See Todd S. Aagaard, Factual 
Premises of Statutory Interpretation in Agency Review Cases, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 366, 372 (2009); 
see also Keeton, supra note 62, at 13 (explaining the scope, influence, and nature of facts that serve 
as premises for deciding an issue of law, or “premise facts”). 
199 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010). 
200 539 U.S. 306, 325-30 (2003). 
201 For a recap of the case and its procedural history (with particular emphasis on the role of 
facts), see Zephyr Teachout, Facts in Exile: Corruption and Abstraction in Citizens United v. Federal 
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Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy denied that independent corpo-
rate spending corrupts politics.202 Looking at both the record before him 
and the record before the Court in McConnell v. Federal Election Commis-
sion,203 an earlier campaign finance case based on a facial challenge to the 
same law, Justice Kennedy found there was “scant evidence” that independ-
ent corporate expenditures lead to political corruption.204  
A year or so later, the Montana Supreme Court had to decide whether 
that factual finding bound its court in Western Tradition v. Attorney Gen-
eral.205 In this case, the court evaluated the validity of a 1912 Montana law 
that was substantially similar to the federal law in Citizens United—it 
forbade corporate campaign expenditures.206 Despite the similarity of the 
two laws, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the Montana campaign 
finance law.207 Chief Justice McGrath, writing for the majority, explained 
that “Citizens United was a case decided under its facts or lack of facts.”208 
He distinguished the case with a history of how corporate expenditures 
negatively affected Montana elections, complete with studies of how 
election spending in Montana was relatively low due to its bar on corporate 
election spending.209 
Not all of the Montana Justices agreed that a new factual record meant 
they were out from under the thumb of Citizens United. Even though Justice 
James Nelson dissented, he criticized Citizens United as “utter nonsense.”210 
Nevertheless, he felt he was duty-bound to apply it: “The Supreme Court 
in Citizens United . . . rejected several asserted governmental interests; and 
this Court has now come along, retrieved those interests from the garbage 
can, dusted them off, slapped a ‘Made in Montana’ sticker on them, and 
held them up as grounds for sustaining a patently unconstitutional state 
statute.”211  
Justice Nelson predicted that the U.S. Supreme Court would be quick to 
reverse the Montana Court. And he was right. Soon after, in a two-paragraph 
 
Election Commission, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 295, 300-02 (2011). Of course, defining what amounts 
to corruption is a thorny legal question that is still controversial. 
202 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360. 
203 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.  
204 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360. 
205 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011), rev’d sub nom., Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 
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208 Id. at 6. 
209 Id. at 6-8. 
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per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court summarily reversed the Montana 
Supreme Court, holding that there could be “no serious doubt” that such a 
result was compelled by Citizens United.212 One way to interpret that 
message (although, as explained in Part IV below, not the only way) is to 
assume that the U.S. Supreme Court Justices established a factual precedent 
that settled once and for all the question about the potentially corrupting 
nature of corporate campaign expenditures. 
Another example of a premise fact—one embraced perhaps by those 
with different ideological preferences—is the premise fact in Grutter v. 
Bollinger that a racially diverse class improves a law school education.213 In 
Grutter, Justice O’Connor affirmed Michigan Law School’s affirmative 
action program by relying on classroom diversity as a compelling govern-
ment interest and by deferring to the law school’s assessment on that 
score.214 She supported her legal conclusion with empirical social science 
research connecting student diversity and educational achievement.215 
Similar to the facts in Citizens United, this claim is controversial and not 
without competing authority for the opposite claim.216 But the relevant 
observation here is that the Court’s holding depends on a factual under-
standing of the world: that students exposed to more racial diversity possess 
greater active thinking processes and academic skills.217 
How should lower courts evaluate affirmative action programs post-
Grutter? Can a record before a lower court citing social science research that 
downplays the educational benefits of racial diversity—like the studies 
recited by Justice Thomas in his Grutter dissent218—justify a different legal 
ruling?  
 
212 Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam). 
213 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003). This premise fact was reaffirmed in Fisher v. University of Texas 
at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
214 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003). 
215 Id. at 330. For a collection of the social science research used by Justice O’Connor in 
Grutter and for examples of countervailing authority, see Michael Heise, Brown Undone?: The 
Future of Integration in Seattle After PICS v. Seattle School District No. 1, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
863, 878-80 (2008).  
216 See, e.g., Mikyong M. Kim & Clifton F. Conrad, The Impact of Historically Black Colleges 
and Universities on the Academic Success of African-American Students, 47 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC. 
399, 421 (2006) (finding that African American students had a similar probability of obtaining a 
bachelor’s degree whether they attended a historically Black college or university or a historically 
White college or university). 
217 See Heise, supra note 215, at 878 (discussing how the majority in Grutter relied on findings 
from the expert witness report of Patricia Y. Gurin). 
218 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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The Fifth Circuit, at least, did not think so. In Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin, the litigants and interested parties marshaled factual evi-
dence that disclaimed any connection between racial diversity and educa-
tional success.219 The Fifth Circuit did not bite, explaining “it is neither our 
role nor purpose to dance from Grutter’s firm holding that diversity is an 
interest supporting compelling necessity.”220 Like Citizens United, Grutter 
thus appears to accomplish two things: it established a rule of law and 
settled a debatable factual question to bind the lower courts.  
III. WHAT SORT OF AUTHORITATIVE FORCE SHOULD ATTACH  
TO SUPREME COURT STATEMENTS OF FACT? 
With some examples now in mind, we must tackle the question that 
lurks behind any discussion of precedent: How should judges treat state-
ments from the past in making decisions in the present? And specifically, 
how much weight, if any, should lower courts give to prior Supreme Court 
statements of fact?  
First, an important clarification is in order. Fred Schauer has effectively 
refined the concept of precedent to explain that there is a difference be-
tween precedent as a rule and precedent as valuable experience.221 The latter 
type of precedent (although perhaps misnamed) is when one decisionmaker 
is “[u]nwilling or unable to do as much thinking, looking, or testing as a 
previous decisionmaker . . . . ‘If Cardozo decided this way who am I to 
disagree?’”222 For that type of precedent, if we truly believe the first deci-
sion was incorrect, we will reject the value of the experience. By contrast, a 
true rule of precedent is a “norm limiting the decisionmaker’s flexibility,” 
which means that “the fact that something was decided before gives it 
present value despite our current belief that the previous decision was 
erroneous.”223 
 
219 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). The U.S. Supreme Court was presented with much of this research 
in the Fisher litigation. See, e.g., Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 13, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345) (“The diversity rationale adopted 
by the Grutter Court was created out of social science-backed whole cloth; it was dubious then, and 
has not withstood the test of time. In particular, the rationale and evidence underlying the 
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body have been significantly undercut since 
the Court’s decision.”); Brief for Gail Heriot et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, 
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345).  
220 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 
2411. 
221 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 575 (1987).  
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This distinction is critical to bear in mind when confronting factual 
precedents. Unless a court tells us (which it often does not), it is impossible 
to know what weight a judge gives to a Supreme Court statement of fact. 
Even if, as in all of the examples discussed in Part II, the judge uses the 
Court’s old factual claim to answer a dispositive question before it, we still 
do not know whether she felt bound to do so, or merely did so because the 
words were easy to find and had a special, prestigious U.S. Reports citation 
attached to them.  
At the end of the day, however, this uncertainty should not detract from 
the normative concerns one has about factual precedents. We know that 
lower courts rely on Supreme Court facts as authority because they cite to 
these facts to explain how they reached important aspects of their decisions. 
And that citation to authority matters in and of itself. 
Law is, after all, “an authoritative practice”: what matters is not just the 
reason, but also from where it comes.224 “[T]he fabric of law,” as Abbe Gluck 
explains, is formed through judicial opinions.225 Thus, she states, methodol-
ogy within those opinions matters, “[e]ven if one cannot prove that meth-
odology dictates outcomes.”226 
The reasons a court gives for its decision and what it cites to support 
those reasons matter to litigants (particularly if their arguments are refuted 
by such authorities).227 Those authorities also matter to future litigants who 
present the same issue later. Whether a judge felt bound by a factual 
authority that he cites, future lawyers and future judges know not and care 
not. That authority becomes part of the legal decision, with explanatory 
power now and persuasive power later. In the words of Fred Schauer, “[T]o 
say ‘x because of y’ is not only to say x, but to say y as well.”228 There are 
consequences, in other words, and commitments that attach when a legal 
decisionmaker gives reasons for her decision.229 To fret about authorities, 
 
224 Schauer, supra note 1, at 1934 (noting that in law, more so than in other disciplines, there 
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THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 5 (1st ed. 1979). 
225 Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consen-
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therefore, even if they are not binding on the decisionmaker, is to worry 
about the very backbone of the legal process itself.230 
This next Part addresses what sort of authoritative force Supreme Court 
facts should carry. Two potential weights are considered: factual statements 
could be binding on lower courts, or they could be especially persuasive by 
virtue of having been decided by the Justices. I reject both possibilities and 
argue against recognizing factual precedents at all. In short, generalized 
factual claims from the Supreme Court should not receive any precedential 
value separate and apart from the legal rules they helped to create.  
A. Binding Authority: A Stare Decisis of Fact? 
One possibility is that factual claims adopted and approved by the Supreme 
Court should bind lower courts faced with those same factual questions 
later—a “factual stare decisis” if you will.231 To my knowledge, no scholar 
has argued that a factual precedent should bind lower courts in any formal 
sense,232 but it appears some lower courts are treating Supreme Court 
factual claims in precisely this manner, even if they are doing so in an 
unthinking and undefended way. It is a useful exercise, therefore, to consider 
the possibility of a factual stare decisis and then to identify precisely what 
problems it creates. 
The argument for factual stare decisis, an argument that would approve 
all of the factual precedents discussed above, would be about efficiency and 
institutional competence. The Supreme Court is better equipped than lower 
courts to handle questions of fact—such as social science data on juvenile 
brain development—because the Justices hear fewer cases than any other 
court and thus have the luxury of time and the benefit of extensive briefing 
by experts, often as amici. If we want better judicial decisionmaking on 
tough empirical questions of fact, the argument goes, then we should assign 
the responsibility to the judges with the time and resources to evaluate 
multiple studies, look into methodological strengths and weaknesses across 
them, and evaluate their credibility. Given these institutional advantages, at 
least relative to other courts,233 the Supreme Court is the best judicial 
institution to settle generalized questions of fact that affect litigation. 
 
230 See Schauer, supra note 1, at 1960 (“If law is an authoritative practice, then a great deal 
turns on what the authorities are.”) 
231 See Gorod, supra note 11, at 63. 
232 See Borgmann, supra note 11, at 1190-91 (arguing the reverse: that a reviewing court should 
defer to the trial court’s findings of social facts). 
233 The question of the Court’s factfinding competence as compared to that of legislative 
bodies is a separate question that many have debated before. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 36, at 
 
  
100 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 59 
 
Benefits of this approach are similar to the benefits of stare decisis gen-
erally: uniformity, efficiency, and predictability.234 Most of these justifica-
tions for stare decisis, both vertical (the obligation of lower courts to follow 
rules of higher courts) and horizontal (the obligation of one court to follow 
its own precedent), share the common goal of furthering the rule of law.235  
Scholars debate whether a strong conception of stare decisis is worth it: 
What good is predictable uniform law if it is wrong?236 Without wading into 
those waters, however, note that virtually everybody believes that legal 
precedents subject to stare decisis are made carefully: they are powerfully 
argued, slowly deliberated, and meticulously justified by multiple people. 
Even if one thinks a legal rule handed down by the Supreme Court is 
wrong, one can at least be assured that it was the product of much process 
and deliberate thought. This careful deliberation alone buttresses the rule of 
law, which, Fred Schauer explains, makes us “feel better.”237 
 
1180 (comparing Congress’s ability to “gather and assess information” with the manner in which 
courts are “shackled by the temporal and reactive nature of litigation”). It is a debate, however, 
that I do not enter today. 
234 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: The Yale Lectures, 120 YALE L.J. 
1999, 2024 (2011) (“When the Court considers the work of past Courts, the key concept is stare 
decisis while the key attitude recognizes the importance of reliance.”); Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus 
Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1843, 1855-57 (2013) 
(cataloguing common justifications for precedent and arguing that views on stare decisis must be 
integrated with a broader interpretive philosophy); Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External 
Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 93-94 (1989) (arguing that stare 
decisis is efficient because it minimizes error and judicial review costs, maximizes the public good 
aspect of judicial decisionmaking, and increases societal demand for judge-made rules).  
235 Indeed, this phrase is commonly used by the Supreme Court when discussing stare deci-
sis. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that 
“the greatest purpose [of stare decisis] is to serve a constitutional ideal—the rule of law”); Welch 
v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1987) (“The rule of law 
depends in large part on adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis. Indeed, the doctrine is ‘a natural 
evolution from the very nature of our institutions.’” (citation omitted)). But see Jeremy Waldron, 
Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach 34-35 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Public Law & 
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-75, 2011), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/abstract_id=1942557 (“I do not endorse the position . . . that ‘[t]he rule of law depends 
in large part on adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis.’ But it might be true the other way 
around: the justification of stare decisis might depend to a large extent on the rule of law.” 
(alteration in original) (footnote omitted)). 
236 See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 
3-4 (2001) (developing a theory of stare decisis based on the principle that there is no harm in 
dispelling the presumption against overruling manifestly erroneous decisions).  
237 See Schauer, supra note 221, at 598 (“Much of what we value about predictability is psy-
chological. I feel better knowing that the letter carrier will come at the same time every day, that 
faculty meetings will not be scheduled on short notice, and that April brings the opening of the 
baseball season. Predictability thus often has value even when we cannot quantify it.”). 
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Factual precedents cannot claim the same thing. They may not be the 
product of careful deliberation. Facts—at least the type of generalized facts 
about the world I am concerned with—are often marshaled by Supreme 
Court Justices to build arguments and to tell a “story.”238 This has several 
implications. For one thing, it means that factual authorities are selected for 
a reason distinct from how likely they are to be accurate. As one judge 
candidly explained, a judge “picks her rhetoric to foreshadow the result.”239 
And she picks her factual claims the same way. “Motivated reasoning” and 
“confirmation bias” are terms psychologists use to describe this phenome-
non—we look for sources to support what we already think we know.240  
A consequence is that there is less trust that the authorities are correct, 
particularly for factual questions that are controversial and the subject of 
easily accessible data from sources with highly variable reliability. Supreme 
Court factfinding has changed since the dawn of the digital revolution. As I 
have observed elsewhere, Supreme Court Justices, like the rest of us, are 
now surrounded by factual information literally at their fingertips.241 They 
no longer need to rely predominately on the adversarial system to supply 
evidence on factual questions; they can just Google for data, empirical 
studies, claims in secondary sources, and newspaper accounts. Of course, 
some information on the Internet is reliable, but some of it is not. And the 
tremendous increase of data available to research means there is almost 
always evidence to support a preexisting view regardless of its reliability.242 
To the extent Justices are researching factual questions on their own, the 
resulting claims can suffer from unrealized bias or be just plainly incor-
rect.243  
 
238 See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1386 (1995) (“When an appellate judge sits down to write up a case, she 
knows how the case will come out and she consciously relates a ‘story’ that will convince the reader 
it has come out right.”). 
239 Id. at 1377. 
240 See Stuart Ford, A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of International Crimi-
nal Courts: Implications for the Success of Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
405, 434 (2012) (“Confirmation bias refers to the tendency for people to search for, interpret, and 
remember information in a way that systematically impedes their ability to reject a preexisting 
hypothesis. In other words, under certain circumstances people tend to search for, recall, and 
interpret information in a way that has a tendency to confirm their existing beliefs.” (footnotes 
omitted)); id. at 420-21 (“The central tenet of motivated reasoning is that ‘[p]eople are more likely 
to arrive at those conclusions that they want to arrive at.’” (alternation in original)). 
241 See Larsen, supra note 7, at 1260-61. 
242 See Berring, supra note 83, at 1690. 
243 See id. (“For the modern Supreme Court there is no final primary authority, only a kalei-
doscope of sources that one can shift to provide any of a number of pictures.”). As others have 
noted, and as I hope to explore in future work, the risk of bias and unreliability can come from 
within the adversary process as well, particularly in light of the recent rise in Supreme Court 
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Exacerbating this situation, factual authorities cited in a Supreme Court 
opinion are very likely selected solely by the Justice writing the opinion to 
make his case to his colleagues. While we can be sure that a legal holding 
that garners five votes at the Court is debated by all of the Justices, the same 
assumption cannot be made about the factual claims that pepper the foot-
notes. Most of the time, presumably, facts mounted to frame an argument 
are not discussed at conference; they are added later by the opinion writer 
at the time the opinion is written. While it is fair to assume all Justices who 
sign on to an opinion have read the factual claims it contains, we cannot 
have the same confidence that the Justices have critically examined every 
factual source cited in the footnotes given the time constraints of litiga-
tion.244 Particularly for factual claims that are not central to the dispute, it 
seems unlikely that a source selected for its rhetorical appeal will be subject 
to careful scrutiny by all of the Justices who sign on to the opinion. 
Another reason to fret about a practice of binding factual precedents is 
that our understanding of the world changes over time. A fact considered 
true in 1955 may seem laughable in 2015. Take, for example, the seemingly 
progressive factual claim, made famous in the Brandeis brief relied on in 
Muller v. Oregon in 1908, that long working hours jeopardize the “general 
welfare, health and morals” of women.245 It is too easy with the benefit of 
hindsight to criticize the Supreme Court for relying on this social science 
which has since been widely refuted.246 It is impossible and unfair to task 
the Justices with the responsibility of seeing into the future on factual 
claims. But the reality is that facts are fickle, and it is unwise to entrench 
them into the law when tomorrow’s science can reveal their flaws. 
At bottom, my concerns with factual precedents are similar to the con-
cerns others have expressed about conflating the line between dicta and 
holdings.247 Generally speaking, a dictum is an assertion in a court opinion 
that is superfluous to the decision. Although identifying this line is sometimes 
 
amicus briefs. See Borgmann, supra note 11, at 1216-18 (arguing that amicus briefs are often written 
as part of a “deliberate campaign” by interest groups and are not a good source for unbiased 
factfinding). 
244 Cf. Wald, supra note 238, at 1374 (“Time does not allow for the same careful, thoughtful 
analysis and writing to be poured into all cases.”). 
245 208 U.S. 412, 414 (1908). 
246 See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Science: Selective 
Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 106 (1993) (“Brandeis’s brief would be assessed 
harshly as junk social science by today’s standards.”). 
247 By making this analogy, I do not mean to imply that facts are always dicta in Supreme 
Court opinions. To be sure, sometimes a factual finding can be critical to a legal holding. 
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challenging,248 the basic notion is that if the judgment would be unaffected 
by the proposition in question, then the proposition is just dicta.249  
As Judge Pierre Leval remarked several years ago, however, “The dis-
tinction between dictum and holding is more and more frequently disre-
garded.”250 Although, he explained, “most agree in the abstract with the 
proposition that dictum does not establish binding law, this rule is now 
honored in the breach with alarming frequency.”251 This temptation is even 
greater when the dictum comes from the U.S. Supreme Court. Many lower 
courts have explicitly stated that Supreme Court dictum is different, and 
that statements by the Supreme Court, even in dicta, should not be idly 
ignored and are more than just “casual suggestion[s].”252 
Why the alarm for the erosion of this dicta line? Judge Leval worries 
that treating dicta as binding makes judges “more likely to exercise flawed, 
ill-considered judgment[s], more likely to overlook salutary cautions and 
contraindications, [and] more likely to pronounce flawed rules.”253 When a 
court comments on issues outside the scope of the judgment, in many 
instances, it does so “with no briefing whatsoever on the issue” and, as 
Judge Leval speculates, with “insufficient judicial scrutiny.”254  
His fear is not new. Michael Dorf has explained that jurists dating back 
at least to Chief Justice Marshall have provided two dominant reasons for 
disregarding dicta: (1) a fear that dicta are less carefully considered than 
holdings and therefore less likely to be accurate, and (2) an Article III 
 
248 I do not mean to undersell the confusion in the courts about how to distinguish holdings 
from dicta. As others have documented, this confusion is significant and pervasive. See Michael C. 
Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2003 (1994) (“No universal agreement exists as 
to how to measure the scope of judicial holdings.”). 
249 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 
1056 (2005) (offering a definition of dicta). 
250 Leval, supra note 103, at 1250. See also David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory 
Versus Practice in Lower Court Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2041 (2013) (arguing 
that the dictum–holding distinction plays a significant role in fewer than 1 in every 2000 federal 
district court cases). 
251 Leval, supra note 103, at 1250. 
252 See United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1167 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (“Most federal 
circuits have recognized that ‘by the way’ statements made by the Supreme Court resonate more 
forcefully than dicta from other sources.”); id. (“It would be disingenuous” to say that statements 
made by the Supreme Court in dicta “amount[] to no more than a casual suggestion.”); see also 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 561 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (“[W]e should not idly ignore considered statements the Supreme Court makes in 
dicta.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
253 Leval, supra note 103, at 1255. 
254 Id. at 1262-63. 
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concern that courts have “legitimate authority only to decide cases, not to 
make law in the abstract.”255  
Both concerns about dicta hold equally true for allocating precedential 
force to generalized factual claims. Factual authorities are less likely to be 
scrutinized than are their legal counterparts and are not always central to 
the question presented. Thus, for the risks about accuracy it creates and the 
legitimacy concerns it exacerbates, factual stare decisis is unwise; a lower 
court should ordinarily not feel bound by a Supreme Court factual claim.  
B. Persuasive Authority: Skidmore Deference to the  
Supreme Court as Factfinder? 
A second possibility is to consider Supreme Court factual statements as 
only persuasive authority. Persuasive authority is the phrase generally given 
to an authority that is not binding on a court but which “depends for its 
influence upon its own merits.”256 This type of authoritative force could take 
two forms.  
One option is that a trial judge cites a historical source or a psychologi-
cal study because he read it and was persuaded by it. Perhaps that study was 
brought to his attention by a Supreme Court opinion, but the U.S. Reports 
are just a convenient place to research. This use of an authority does not 
involve deference at all; the factual authority is only persuasive to the extent 
it has the power to persuade on its own.  
This is not, however, an accurate description of the way lower courts cite 
Supreme Court factual claims. In the cases described in Part II above, the 
courts cite the actual Supreme Court language in the U.S. Reports without 
always including the original factual source. It must matter to these lower 
courts that the Justices used the authority once before—the Supreme Court 
citation gives the source an extra bump of persuasive power supplemental to 
the power it contains independently.257  
This is more than just the power to persuade. One way to think about 
this is to consider the Supreme Court as a default factfinder that offers a 
presumptive, but rebuttable, answer to factual questions. For administrative 
 
255 Dorf, supra note 248, at 2001. 
256 Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t; When Do We Kiss It and When 
Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605, 632 (1990). 
257 Once a factual authority is cited in the U.S. Reports, the source automatically becomes 
more prestigious. As John Merryman observed over sixty years, ago this has “an unavoidable effect 
on future decisions. As a work increases in stature it becomes more authoritative—more capable of 
influencing the actual consideration of cases by judges.” Merryman, supra note 197, at 619. 
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law types, this is Skidmore258 deference, which lies “somewhere between the 
poles of independent judgment and controlling deference.”259 On this view, 
a lower court judge does more than apply her own judgment about the 
merits of the factual source; she defers to the first decisionmaker (here, the 
Supreme Court) because there are contextual reasons surrounding the first 
decision that justify the deference. Just as an agency’s expertise deserves 
some deference, Supreme Court factual findings, the argument goes, should 
generate the same respect.260  
Put differently, because lower courts are overburdened and under-
funded, it may make sense to offer them a shortcut through Supreme Court 
factfinding. That shortcut is desirable, however, only if the Supreme Court 
is competent to be an authority on the factual claims it makes. And there 
are significant reasons to doubt that conclusion. 
By way of illustration, for almost every factual claim discussed in Part II 
above, there is some countervailing authority that could have been selected 
to make the opposite point. Recall Justice O’Connor’s assertion in Toyota 
Motor Manufacturing v. Williams that carpal tunnel typically heals on its own 
without surgery. Indeed, she found legitimate authority to support this 
claim; but a click of the mouse reveals a range of authorities to support the 
opposite proposition.261 Likewise, Justice Ginsburg’s assertion in her 
 
258 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
259 Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1241 (2007); see also Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing 
Skidmore within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1127 (2001) (discussing 
the Supreme Court’s use of Skidmore deference in a case in which the Court “summarily dismisses 
any notion of deference for the agency . . . [and] refers to its own independent reading of the 
statute”). 
260 There are competing conceptions of Skidmore and what it precisely means when a lower 
court reviews agency decisionmaking. Compare Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the 
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 564 (1985), with Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead 
Doctrine, 54 ADMIN L. REV. 807, 812 (2002). Some say Skidmore deference is nothing more than 
independent judgment. Others say it involves more than independent judgment and embodies 
some sort of actual deference to the first decisionmaker, although less than would be given under 
Chevron. For purposes of this Article, I adopt the second conception of Skidmore, which seems to 
be the one that dominates in the lower courts. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 259, at 1281 
(describing how courts of appeals “overwhelmingly” use the standards-based approach of Skidmore 
deference). 
261 See Joshua Tucker, When Will That Carpal Tunnel Go Away? The Correct Questions Is, Will 
It Ever Go Away?, EZINE @RTICLES, http://ezinearticles.com/?When-Will-That-Carpal-Tunnel-
Go-Away?—The-Correct-Questions-Is,-Will-it-Ever-Go-Away?&id=2187115 (last visited Oct. 25, 
2013) (“Carpal Tunnel won’t just go away. It’s not an injury that needs to ‘heal’. Waiting it out is a 
losing strategy.”); Dr. Younai, Preventing Carpal Tunnel, ARTICLESBASE (Dec. 14, 2010), http:// 
www.articlesbase.com/alternative-medicine-articles/preventing-carpal-tunnel-3842709.html (“[The] 
fact is carpal tunnel does not go away on its own[.] [I]nstead the signs and symptoms are 
persistent and need to be treated immediately because carpal tunnel is [a] progressive disease.”). 
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Carhart dissent that reports of postabortion depression are exaggerated is 
supported by a string cite to articles in many reputable journals.262 But 
someone attempting to prove the opposite point could easily construct her 
own long string cite including articles that, to the untrained eye, appear 
reputable and purport to be peer-reviewed and the result of long-term 
studies.263  
And giving credence to the line that “history is [an] argument without 
end,”264 the Supreme Court’s ventures into history are likewise subject to 
challenge by countervailing factual authorities. For example, the Court’s 
factual account of the history of the Second Amendment and the founding 
generation’s attitudes towards guns in District of Columbia v. Heller265 could 
have been radically different depending on the one recounting the tale.266  
 
262 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S 124, 183 n.7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
263 See, e.g., Jesse R. Cougle et al., Depression Associated with Abortion and Childbirth: A Long-
term Analysis of the NLSY Cohort, 9 MED. SCI. MONIT. CR157, CR162 (2003), available at 
http://www.vozvictimas.org/pdf/documentos/cougle2003.pdf (“At an average of eight years after 
their first pregnancy, women who aborted their first pregnancy have significantly higher likelihood 
of being at risk for clinical depression than childbearing women who do not report a history of 
abortion.”); Jonathan Gornall, Where Do We Draw the Line, 334 BMJ 285, 288 (2007) (discussing a 
study by David Fergusson and his colleagues that tracked 500 women up to age 25 and found that 
“those who had had abortions had higher rates of depression, suicidal behavior, and other mental 
problems that could not be explained by conditions that existed before the pregnancy” (citing 
David M. Fergusson et al., Abortion in Young Women and Subsequent Mental Health, 47 J. CHILD 
PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 16 (2006))); Steve Ertelt, Recent Studies Confirm Women Face Depression 
After Abortion, Other Problems, LIFENEWS.COM (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.lifenews. 
com/2010/09/28/nat-6733 (“An August study published in the Journal of Pregnancy and involving 
374 women who had abortions—more than five times the number of women who appeared in the 
new study—found women having high rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms 
for women having both early and late abortions.”). 
264 This common saying is generally attributed to Pieter Geyl. See, e.g., Jeffrey Kimball, The 
Influence of Ideology on Interpretive Disagreement: A Report on a Survey of Diplomatic, Military and 
Peace Historians on the Causes of 20th Century U.S. Wars, 17 HIST. TEACHER 355, 355 (1984) 
(quoting Geyl). 
265 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
266 Historians have challenged the accuracy of the account in Heller which grounds the Se-
cond Amendment in the founding generation’s alleged desire to bear arms for personal self-
defense. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
145, 171 (2008) (questioning the history of the Second Amendment as recounted in Heller); Akhil 
R. Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 
889, 904 (“[A]t the Founding, the Second [Amendment] was primarily a military amendment.”); 
H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in Context: The Case of the 
Vanishing Predicate, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 433-34 (2000) (discussing how the Ratifiers 
interpreted the Second Amendment in the context of “communal military units,” not in the 
context of a private right to bear arms); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: 
Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 246-47 (2008) (“[T]here is a radically different 
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The point here is not a “gotcha” one; for purposes of this Article it does 
not matter to me which side of these factual debates has it right. The point 
instead is that today’s digital world makes it very easy to find factual 
authorities—even authorities making completely opposite claims—and 
discerning which one is right (particularly outside one’s area of expertise) is 
no easy task.  
There is no good reason, therefore, to trust that one Justice one after-
noon has stumbled upon the accurate side of a factual debate while trying to 
convince his colleagues of a legal position. If the authorities she cites are 
persuasive to a lower court, then they are persuasive to a lower court. But 
no supplemental authoritative force—no extra persuasive bump—should 
attach to the factual sources because they appeared in the U.S. Reports. 
The analogy to Skidmore deference is therefore quite helpful. The level 
of deference due to an agency under Skidmore depends on certain contextual 
circumstances: “the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, 
and relative expertness, and . . . the persuasiveness of the agency’s posi-
tion.”267  
Very few of those factors apply to the Supreme Court’s assertions of 
legislative facts. As described above, the Court’s factual statements—the 
ones that are then used by lower courts as authorities later—are often found 
off the record, sometimes without the vote of five Justices, and without 
assurance that the factual authorities were deliberated or carefully inspect-
ed. Indeed it is also quite possible that the factual source was discovered by 
the author of a Supreme Court opinion, not in a search for a truth, but 
instead to make a rhetorical argument more persuasive.268 Applying a 
Skidmore-type deference to Supreme Court factfinding, therefore, is inap-
propriate because the contextual circumstances surrounding the factfinding 
do not merit the extra deference. 
What, then, should a trial judge do with a new case and a new factual 
record when faced with an on-point statement of generalized fact from the 
nation’s highest court? The best choice, I think, is to ignore it. Of course, 
the U.S. Reports are fair game to research, and if a factual authority 
 
reading of Heller. The constitutional text is ambiguous, and many historians believe that the 
Second Amendment does not, in fact, create a right to use guns for nonmilitary purposes.”). 
267 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (footnotes omitted) (citing Skid-
more v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)). For a helpful analysis of Skidmore deference as 
it has evolved, see Hickman & Krueger, supra note 259, at 1258. 
268 See Borgmann, supra note 11, at 1190 (asserting that “appellate courts’ ‘factfinding’ is often 
less a search for the truth than for good rhetorical sound bites to support a court’s favored 
outcome”). 
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unearthed by a Justice is persuasive to the lower court judge at face value, 
then certainly he should feel free to rely on it. But the influence that 
authority has on the judge should not depend on the fact that it once 
appeared in an opinion authored by a Supreme Court Justice. The default 
rule, in other words, should be to give no authoritative force to Supreme 
Court statements of fact. 
This rule would assuage the concerns outlined above: the risk that a fac-
tual claim is selected by the Justices for reasons other than that it is the 
most accurate source among a sea of sources; the distinct possibility that the 
fact will change over time; the legitimacy concern (tied up with the nature 
of dicta) that the factual claim may not be properly before the Court and is 
therefore beyond its authority to decide; and, even putting aside those 
worries, the likelihood that a lower court will take the factual claim out of 
context. 
IV. WHAT TO DO WITH “PREMISE FACTS”? 
Assuming I have built a convincing case against most types of factual 
precedents, one difficult puzzle persists to which I offer some preliminary 
thoughts. As described above, there are times where the Supreme Court’s 
legal pronouncement depends quite explicitly on a factual claim—a factual 
premise to the legal decision. When the Court makes one of those claims, 
like in Citizens United or Grutter, it seems to be authoritatively answering a 
factual question for the nation. In these cases the risk is not that lower 
courts will take the Supreme Court’s language out of context; instead, we 
are confronting a factual precedent that seems purposely set.  
What should lower courts do when parties come to court with new evi-
dence that challenges one of those factual claims? If those factual claims are 
off limits, then we have condoned at least one type of factual precedent, 
even if it seems odd for nine Justices to be the final arbiter of a fact. If the 
answer, however, is that those factual claims are up for debate in any lower 
court in subsequent litigation, then we run the risk of chaos or at least a 
serious weak spot in the Supreme Court’s authority.  
Consider the recent exchange between the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
Montana Supreme Court over the potentially corrupting nature of corporate 
campaign expenditures.269 Recall that Justice Kennedy found no reliable 
evidence (on either the record before him or on Supreme Court records 
 
269 See supra Section II.E for a discussion of Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and 
Western Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Attorney General, 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011). 
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previously built on the subject) that independent corporate campaign 
expenditures corrupt the political process.270 Undeterred, the Montana 
litigants built a new record and successfully argued the opposite factual 
claim to the highest court in their state; the Montana Supreme Court 
upheld Montana’s campaign finance law because the case before it had 
“different facts” from those in Citizens United.271  
What lessons do we draw from the quick summary reversal handed 
down by the U.S Supreme Court six months later?272 In a two paragraph per 
curiam opinion, the Court explained “there [could] be no serious doubt” 
that Citizens United applied to the Montana law.273 Four Justices dissented 
from the per curiam opinion, but even they seemed to admit that the new 
factual record did not relieve Montana from the force of the precedent; 
their plea, instead, was to reconsider Citizens United itself.274 
One possible explanation of this sequence of events is that the Citizens 
United majority believed it was settling—nationally—the factual question of 
whether independent corporate expenditures corrupt politics. On this view, 
five Justices created a factual precedent, and the Montana challenge to that 
precedent got the back of the Court’s hand. Tabling the difficult question 
about whether the Supreme Court has the power to conclusively answer 
factual questions about the world and command that its answer bind all 
other courts, allow me to offer a different explanation for the Montana 
summary reversal.  
Perhaps the “factual finding” in Citizens United about corporate election 
expenditures was not actually a finding of fact but, instead, was just part of 
the Court’s legal rule. To be sure, the Court talks like it is making a factual 
finding. Justice Kennedy, remember, scanned the “records” and discovered 
“scant evidence” of political corruption.275 But although this sounds like an 
empirical or quasi-empirical finding, I submit that with premise facts like 
these the Court is not really finding facts but is rather building bright line 
rules. Rather than embracing, for example, a standard that corporate 
election expenditures are protected by the First Amendment when it is 
 
270 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360. 
271 W. Tradition P’ship, 271 P.3d at 6. 
272 Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam). 
273 Id. at 2491-92. 
274 See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Montana’s experience, like considerable experience else-
where since the Court’s decision in Citizens United, casts grave doubt on the Court’s supposition 
that independent expenditures do not corrupt or appear to do so. Were the matter up to me, I 
would vote to grant the petition for certiorari in order to reconsider Citizens United or, at least, its 
application in this case.”). 
275 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360. 
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reasonably doubtful they will corrupt, the Court instead adopted a rule that 
corporate election spending is protected because it generally does not cause 
corruption. 
The Court’s rule was fueled by a factual understanding of the world—a 
generalization about politics and money. Surely, that understanding is not 
always accurate, as was apparently the case in Montana. But this overinclu-
sive nature is the very essence of the distinction between a rule and a 
standard. When reading Citizens United, it sounds like the Court is estab-
lishing a fact (corporate money does not create corruption) and reasoning a 
rule from it (therefore the First Amendment protects it). I think, however, 
that the Court is working in the other direction—choosing a rule over a 
standard and expressing the generalized factual observations that led it to 
make that choice. 
This would not be extraordinary because the Supreme Court frequently 
embeds factual generalizations in legal rules. In Gonzales v. Carhart, for 
example, the Supreme Court considered the factual question of whether a 
particular method of partial-birth abortion was ever medically necessary.276 
Under my definition, this is a question of fact: it can be refuted and is 
supported by testable evidence. But it would be odd for the Court to 
provide an authoritative answer to this question as a pure factual matter. 
Would any doctor who testified otherwise be wrong because five Justices of 
the Supreme Court said so?  
Instead of viewing the Court as factfinder on this question, a closer look 
at Carhart reveals something more complex. The Carhart Court created a 
legal rule granting government discretion to legislate within the medical 
uncertainty of whether partial-birth abortions are ever necessary to preserve 
the health of the mother.277 This answer entangles law and fact; it melds the 
two together to form a legal rule.  
We thus find ourselves back where this project began with the tricky 
endeavor of distinguishing factual questions from legal ones. Perhaps the 
best way to understand the precedential value of “premise facts,” therefore, 
is to recognize that with premise facts we have left the land of facts alto-
gether. These “facts” have precedential value because they are not facts, but 
rather part of a legal rule.  
The Montana litigation following Citizens United is best understood this 
way: by reversing the Montana Court, the Supreme Court was flexing its 
 
276 550 U.S. 124, 165-66 (2007). 
277 See id. at 163 (“The Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass 
legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.”). 
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muscles as the final authority on the dispute. It was not, however, using its 
authoritative muscles to settle the empirical dispute about the effect of 
corporate money on elections. Citizens United is binding on Montana not 
because the Court settled the factual question about election practices for 
everyone; it is precedent because it is part of a legal rule that, by its nature, 
is overinclusive.  
Grutter v. Bollinger can be read the same way.278 One way to understand 
Grutter is to read Justice O’Connor’s opinion as finding, as a factual matter, 
that a racially diverse class enriches a law school education and benefits 
society as a whole. Indeed, the part of the opinion making this point sounds 
like a factual recitation: she cites data-rich empirical studies and states that 
“[t]hese benefits are not theoretical but real.”279 Should lower courts quickly 
dismiss studies on the other side of this debate because the Supreme Court 
made a conclusive factual claim that went the other way? 
I do not think that is the best way to understand Grutter’s mandate. Like 
Citizens United, Grutter used factual claims to form a legal rule: the data 
indicating the benefits of a racially diverse class justifies deference to 
university officials as a matter of law.280 On this read, just like in Citizens 
United, the legislative fact is embedded in the legal rule; the precedential 
effect stems from the legal component of the decision, not the factual one.  
So what happens to our lower court judge who must decide whether to 
hear evidence on a factual question the Supreme Court has purported to 
answer? How does he know whether to hold a hearing on the benefits of a 
racially diverse class or to consider the issue resolved by fiat due to its 
intrinsic relationship to a legal rule?  
To solve this problem, I propose a clear statement rule.281 If the Su-
preme Court is clear that its factual statements are part of a legal rule, then 
the statements are authoritative due to their legal component. Absent such a 
 
278 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
279 Id. at 330. 
280 See id. (“In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial, nu-
merous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning . . . .”). 
281 A clear statement rule tells courts they should not read a statute in a way that will have 
certain consequences unless Congress has been clear it intended those consequences to ensue. See 
generally David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 
946 (1992) (“The tendency of courts to require clear legislative articulation of changes in private 
liberty or property interests is not without its critics . . . .”); John F. Manning, Clear Statement 
Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 407-08 (2010); Thomas B. Bennett, Note, The 
Canon at the Water’s Edge, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 207, 210 (2012). A clear statement rule about factual 
precedents would similarly instruct courts to limit their reliance on Supreme Court factual claims, 
unless the Court is specific about the mixed legal–factual component of such statements.  
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clear label, a lower court should assume that the factual dispute is open for 
debate. 
Consider the following example of how a clear statement rule could operate. 
In New York v. Belton, the Supreme Court considered whether the police 
could search the passenger compartment of a car as incident to the driver’s 
arrest.282 The Court noted as a factual matter—or as the dissent called it, a 
“fiction”—that, most of the time, items in the passenger side of a car are 
within arm’s reach of the arrestee.283 It admitted this observation was a 
“generalization” but stressed the need for the categorical approach in order 
to produce a result that was “workable.”284 The Court thus explicitly made 
its factual observation a critical part of a bright line rule. 
Subsequent to Belton, many defendants brought challenges to the rule on 
the basis that the factual claim it embraced—that most passenger compart-
ments of a car are within the driver’s reach—was simply not true in their 
specific cases.285 Indeed, the frequency of the challenges and the size of the 
“chorus” that had called for the Court to reconsider Belton ultimately 
prevailed.286 In 2009, in Arizona v. Gant, the Court disavowed the “broad” 
reading of Belton—the one that had been embraced by the lower courts and 
widely taught in police academies.287 Instead, it announced a rule of reason 
so that the facts of each specific case would determine whether articles 
inside a car are in fact within arm’s reach of the arrestee.288  
What does Belton teach us about factual precedents? In Belton, the Court 
used a legislative fact (a generalized observation about car design) to set a 
legal rule. Challenges to that fact were largely unsuccessful until the Court 
changed course, but not because the Court had set a factual precedent. 
When a majority of the Court either no longer believed in the factual 
premise or thought the rule stemming from the factual claim was unwise, it 
changed its mind by abandoning the legal rule and instead adopting a 
standard.  
One can criticize Belton as an inappropriate context for a rule over a 
standard, but, regardless, I applaud the Court for the candor it used about 
 
282 453 U.S. 454, 455-57 (1981). 
283 Id. at 460. 
284 Id. 
285 For a discussion of the lower court decisions on this issue, see Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 
332, 342-43 (2009). 
286 Id. at 338. 
287 Id. at 347. 
288 See id. at 351 (“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if 
the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or 
it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”). 
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the role facts played in the opinion. Helpfully for lower courts faced with 
interpreting Belton, the Court was precise that its factual observation was a 
“generalization,” producing a “workable rule.”289 Love it or hate it, the 
Belton rule was precedential as a rule of law—one implanted with factual 
claims for sure but a rule of law nonetheless. Without such a clear state-
ment, courts cannot know whether they should independently examine 
whether passenger compartments are within a driver’s reach. I propose that 
absent a clear statement from the Supreme Court announcing a rule 
informed by a factual generalization, a lower court should assume it is not 
bound by the Court’s factual statement. 
Adopting this interpretive rule would produce several positive results. 
First, it would presumably limit the creation of factual precedents. To the 
extent a lower court judge is confused about the authoritative force attached 
to Supreme Court factual claims, the interpretive rule would provide 
guidance: when in doubt, assume you are not bound. This result is beneficial 
because of the risks associated with the unfettered practice of citing the 
Court on factual claims. In addition, it provides clarity to judges who are 
unsure whether the factual question remains open. 
Granted, my proposed clear statement rule cannot prevent judges who 
want to cite to the Court’s facts for calculated reasons—indeed, there is 
little that can be done about. But, an additional benefit of the clear state-
ment rule lies in its signaling power. Like other clear statement rules, this 
one would be fueled by normative concerns: a nervousness about relying on 
authorities (the Justices) who are not authoritative on the subject at hand. 
Presumably, a jurisdiction that adopted this interpretive rule would send a 
message that factual precedents are disfavored. Thus, in theory at least, 
there would be a decrease in the use of factual precedents out of context by 
lower courts seeking to value Supreme Court factual claims beyond their 
actual worth. 
Second, putting aside its effect on lower courts, an interpretive rule 
could serve to encourage candor and precision on the Supreme Court itself 
with respect to facts. Currently, the Court finds facts unabashedly and often 
cavalierly. As in Citizens United, it is very difficult to tell from reading its 
opinions when the Court is finding a fact and when the Court is articulating 
a legal rule. Exacerbating the already challenging task of distinguishing fact 
from law, the Court often speaks in “factfinding” phrases when it announces 
rules—evaluating “evidence” on the record and supporting observations 
 
289 Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. Of course, one can always fault the Court (and some have) for 
not being precise enough.  
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about the world with empirical data and published studies.290 It is easy to 
understand why a lower court, like Montana, might think Citizens United 
was a case “decided upon its facts or lack of facts.”291 
My clear statement rule would provide an incentive for the Supreme 
Court to be precise on the role facts play in its decisions. The Court would 
be able to insulate its decision from future factual challenge only if it is clear 
that the fact is blended with the legal rule. The surest way to make some-
thing unreviewable is for the Court to adopt a rule that makes factfinding 
irrelevant: to hold, for example, that the Constitution is colorblind or that 
there is no possible justification for banning corporate speech. But the 
Justices need not go so far as to abandon all factual dimensions of their 
analysis; they simply need to be clear about what role the facts are playing. 
And, if they are not clear, then lower courts should assume the facts are not 
part of a legal rule and consequently get no precedential effect.  
There are risks to this approach, to be sure. It is possible that an errone-
ous factual premise will become enshrined with a legal rule and, conse-
quently, entrenched nationwide. It is also possible that the Justices will be 
tempted to obscure the role the fact plays and be less than candid when a 
legal rule depends on a factual claim. What if, for example, the Court is 
wrong on a premise fact like the one in Citizens United and, because it says it 
is part of a legal rule, it becomes immune to challenge in other forums?  
But this objection—although legitimate—already exists and will persist 
to the extent facts have any role to play in Supreme Court doctrine. Moreover, 
the response to this risk is one familiar to discussions of stare decisis: the 
Court will have to wait and correct its course another day. Indeed, when the 
Court revisits a precedent, it already considers changed understandings of 
the facts.292 At least with a default rule against factual precedents, the 
factual question is more often open to challenge in lower courts on new 
records with new evidence. Litigation can form a valuable vehicle for the 
Court to revisit its rule if the factual predicate changes over time.  
 
290 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360-61 (2010) (stating there is only “scant 
evidence” that independent corporate expenditures lead to political corruption); Grutter v. 
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consideration of the role social science played in the Grutter opinion, see Heise, supra note 215, at 
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292 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (discussing how the 
Court had overturned its own precedent based on “an understanding of facts, changed from those 
which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional resolutions”). 
  
2013] Factual Precedents 115 
CONCLUSION 
New technological changes in how we access information will inevitably 
affect how judges use facts to explain their decisions. There is much to be 
gained from firmly rooting judicial opinions in facts about the world. Our 
challenge, however, as we embrace this useful new tool is to safeguard 
against unintended sloppy results that can come from being surrounded by 
infinite information. Limiting factual precedents is one such solution. 
Lower courts should look to the Supreme Court for guidance on the law, 
but they should not treat the Justices as experts on everything—particularly 
on subjects on which they are not and do not claim to be the ultimate 
authority.  
 
